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Stevenson: Abusing Abuse of Discretion: Judicial Review of ERISA Fiduciaries

ABUSING ABUSE OF DISCRETION: JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ERISA FIDUCIARIES'
DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS IN DENIAL OF
BENEFITS CASES
ChristopherR. Stevenson

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act' ("ERISA" or the "Act") to provide strong 2 and uniform 3 protections for employees' benefits.4 While underfunded pension plans were
the prime impetus for the enactment of ERISA, 5 the Act covers other
benefits, including health care plans.6 For most of the intervening time,
* Attorney, Federal Aviation Administration. Special thanks to Peter G. Eikenberry for starting the
author down the path for this Article and Christopher M. Fairman for assistance in the publication
process.
1. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406,
88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461) (2006).
2. See ERISA § 2(b) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect ... the
").
interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries ....
3. ERISA § 514 ("[T]he provisions of this [title] ...shall supersede any and all State laws
").
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ....
4. See generally Alison S. Rozbruch, Note, Resolving the Conflict Between Two Visions For
A Standardof Review In ERISA Denial of Benefit Claims, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 507, 514-21 (2001) (discussing uniformity and participant protection as the "twin aims of ERISA") (citations omitted);
Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standardof Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 AM. U. L. REV.
1083, 1087-95 (2001). But see Nola A. Kohler, An Overview of the Inconsistency Among the Circuits Concerningthe Conflict of InterestAnalysis Applied in an ERISA Action With an Emphasis on
the Eighth Circuit's Adoption of the Sliding Scale Analysis in Woo v. Deluxe Corp., 75 N.D. L.
REV. 815, 817-18 (1999) (presenting participant protection as Congress's overriding goal in enacting ERISA); George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the FederalCommon Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 955, 978, 980-94 (1995) (putting forth participant protection and
the creation of tax incentives to plan formation as the two purposes of ERISA).
5. See Dahlia Schwartz, Note, Breathing Lessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward a Reconciliation of ERISA's Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Arena, 79 B.U. L. REV. 631, 63536 (1999) (observing that ERISA was enacted in response to underfunded pension plans, the lack of
a fiduciary requirement on pension administrators, and the difficulty faced by plan administrators in
following differing state laws).
6. "'[E]mployee welfare benefit plan' ... mean[s] any plan ... maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization ... for the purpose of providing for its participants or their beneficiaries ... (A) medical . . . care ...

or benefits in the event of sickness, accident, disability ...
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the jurisprudence of the federal courts has failed to live up to these goals
of ERISA.
ERISA provides for a private right of action to recover benefits under an employee benefit plan,7 and places a fiduciary responsibility on
the administrators of the plan.8 Under these fiduciary duties, the ERISA
plan is to be administered solely for the benefit of the employees who
are covered by the plan. 9 The statute lays out some guidelines for fiduciaries,' 0 but ERISA's provisions contain no guidance for courts regarding the proper standard of review to apply when hearing challenges to
the decisions of plan administrators."
In addition to the statutory text of ERISA, various provisions have
been promulgated in the Code of Federal Regulations regarding employee benefit plans. 2 However, none of these provide guidance to the
courts regarding standards of review for denial of benefits claims or nontrivial guidelines for how ERISA
fiduciaries should conduct themselves
3
around conflicts of interest.1
Despite Congress's good intentions, employees whose ERISA
health claims had been denied still faced an uphill battle in federal court.
Circuit courts erroneously imported the overly-deferential arbitrary and
capricious standard of review into ERISA, making it unlikely for any but
the most blatantly unreasonable administrator's decisions to be overturned. In 1989, the Supreme Court recognized this problem in deciding
Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch,14 discarding the arbitrary and
capricious standard. 15 While establishing de novo review as the default

(B) any benefit described in [29 USC § 186(c)] .... " ERISA § 3(1).
7. ERISA § 502(a) ("A civil action may be brought-(l) by a participant or beneficiary ...
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan.").
8. ERISA § 3(21)(A) ("[A] person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he
exercises any discretionary authority ... respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority ...

respecting management or disposition of its assets ...

or (iii) he has any discretionary

authority... in the administration of such plan.").
9. ERISA § 404(a)(1) ("[A] fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely
in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries and - (A) for the exclusive purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan.").
10. ERISA §§ 401-412.
11. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 108-09 (1989) ("Although it is a
'comprehensive and reticulated statute,' ERISA does not set out the appropriate standard of review
for actions under § 1132(a)(1)(B) challenging benefit eligibility determinations.") (citations omitted).
12. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-2 - 25.09.99-1 (2005).
13. See id.
14. 489 U.S. 101 (1989).
15. Id. at 109-10 ("A comparison of the LMRA and ERISA, however, shows that the whole-
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for ERISA denial of benefits claims,'

6

Firestone also allowed ERISA

plans to grant full discretion to plan administrators, changing the standard of review to abuse of discretion. 7 However, even in these cases,
the Court in Firestone warned that conflicts of interest on the part of the
ERISA8 plan administrators must be taken into account in judicial re-

view. 1

Despite Firestone,most of the circuit courts declined to break with

their prior use of the arbitrary and capricious standard.1 9 The realities of
the health care industry dictate that most employee benefits plans grant
discretion to the ERISA plan fiduciary regarding plan interpretation and

benefits determination. As such, arbitrary and capricious review continued as the de facto default standard. More worrisome, while the circuit

courts adopted various modifications to their standards of review to putatively deal with conflicted ERISA plan fiduciaries, these modifications
achieved a semblance of uniformity only in the ease with which they
tended to brush aside these conflicts of interest.

If a worker lived in the wrong circuit, it was possible for an insurance company acting as an ERISA fiduciary to deny that worker health

care benefits, have that decision considered on appeal by a panel consisting solely of insurance company employees, and be subject to only a
cursory review in federal court. This cursory review would be based
almost exclusively on an administrative record prepared by the insurance

company and would effectively ignore the tremendous structural conflict
of interest that arises when a fiduciary must pay beneficiary claims out
of general company coffers.
In the wake of inconsistent application-or non-application--of
Firestone, the Supreme Court recently revisited these issues in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn.20 In MetLife, the Supreme Court reite-

rated its holding in Firestonethat conflicts of interest must be taken into
sale importation of the arbitrary and capricious standard into ERISA is unwarranted ....Without
this jurisdictional analogy, LMRA principles offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary and
capricious standard ... ").
16. Id. at 115 ("[A] denial of benefits challenged under § 132(a)(l)(B) is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.").
17. See id. at 111 ("Trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate when a
trustee exercises discretionary powers." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959))).
18. See Firestone,489 U.S. at 115 ("Of course, if abenefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a
'facto[r] in determining whether there is an abuse of discretion."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959))).
19. See, e.g., Williams v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1134-37 (11th Cir.
2004) (applying the heightened arbitrary and capricious review).
20. 128 S.Ct. 2343 (2008).
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account, and clarifying that insurers making benefits determination and
paying claims out of pocket were operating under a conflict of interest.
The state of affairs prior to MetLife failed ERISA's goals of protecting workers and providing uniformity in their benefits determinations. This Article's goal is to propose a method for the circuit courts to
implement a standard consistent with Firestone and MetLife and that fulfills ERISA's legislative objectives.
This Article is divided into seven parts. Part 1I will examine how
the arbitrary and capricious standard was imported into ERISA jurisprudence, and how it was applied. 2' Part III will review the Court's decision in Firestone.22 Part IV will discuss the form of discretionary review
used in the lower courts from the Firestone decision to today, and how it
has (or has not) been modified by the presence of conflicts of interest in
the ERISA plan fiduciaries. 23 Part V will address the Court's decision in
MetLife and the impact it has had so far on circuit court jurisprudence.2 4
Finally, Part VI will put forth the author's suggestion for how judicial
review of ERISA plan administrator's decisions should be conducted; in
order to maintain consistency with Firestone and MetLife and the purpose and language of ERISA
II. ARBITRARY

AND CAPRICIOUS: JUDICIAL REVIEW PRE-FIRESTONE

When courts first began hearing ERISA denial of benefits claims,
they were unfettered by statutory limitations, but unassisted by statutory
guidance.2 6 Out of this vacuum, the circuit courts unanimously adopted
an arbitrary and capricious standard originating in pre-ERISA labor
law.2 7 This standard proved to be a poor fit for ERISA.
The arbitrary and capricious standard that would later plague
ERISA litigation arose out of the Labor-Management Relations Act of
21. See discussion infra Part II.
22. See discussion infra Part III.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.
24. See discussion infra Part V.
25. See discussion infra Part VI.
26. See supranotes 10-13 and accompanying text.
27. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 (observing that "[t]o fill this gap, federal courts have adopted
the arbitrary and capricious standard [of review) developed under... 29 U.S.C. § 186(c), a provision of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947."); see also Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1109
("[C]ourts continued the pre-ERISA standard of arbitrary and capricious."); Rozbruch, supra note 4,
at 522-23; Michael S. Beaver, The Standard of Review in ERISA Benefits Denial Cases After Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch: Revolution or Djd Vu?, 26 TORT & INS. L. J. 1, 3 (1990)
("[C]ourts determining benefits cases under the new federal statute simply reasoned by analogy that
the arbitrary and capricious standard should be transplanted from LMRA actions to ERISA actions.").
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1947 ("LMRA").

28

The LMRA did not create a private right of action to

challenge the decisions made by trustees pursuant to the law. 29 Federal
courts adopted the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard in
order to justify
asserting jurisdiction to hear challenges to LMRA trustee
30
decisions.

The federal courts imported this arbitrary and capricious standard
from the LMRA for a number of reasons. The two laws both operate in
the general category of employer-employee relations and employee benefits. ERISA incorporates a significant amount of language from the
LMRA, such as plan definitions 31 and language relating to fiduciary du-

ties.32 Adopting the same standard in these two related laws avoided the
increased complication of having different standards of review for different types of employee benefits lawsuits. In addition, significant judicial apprehension over a potential explosion of employee benefits litigation may have caused the courts to lean towards a standard that was less
favorable for plaintiffs.3 3
28. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 101-80, 61 Stat. 161 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
29. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 109 ("The LMRA does not provide for judicial review of the decisions of LMRA trustees.").
30. Id. at 109 ("Federal courts adopted the arbitrary and capricious standard both as a standard
of review and, more importantly, as a means of asserting jurisdiction over suits under § 186(c) by
beneficiaries of LMRA plans who were denied benefits by trustees."). See also John A. McCreary,
Jr., Comment, The Arbitrary and CapriciousStandard Under ERISA: Its Originsand Applications,
23 DuQ. L. REV. 1033, 1037-38 (1985) ("The remarkable aspect of this evolution is that the federal
courts took state common law fiduciary standards and fashioned a body of federal common law peculiar to [LMRA] trusts, without apparent jurisdiction or authority to do so.").
31. Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 3(l)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(1)(B) (2006) (defining covered plans as including "any benefit described in section 302(c) of
the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 186(c) (other than pensions on retirement
or death, and insurance to provide such pensions).").
32. NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 332 (1981) ("ERISA essentially codified the
strict fiduciary standards that [an LMRA] § 302(c)(5) trustee must meet."). See Rozbruch, supra
note 4, at 521-22 (observing that federal courts justified the use of the LMRA's arbitrary and capricious standard on the grounds that Congress had deliberately drafted ERISA's fiduciary provision to
be similar to those in the LMRA).
33. See M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247, 250-51 (2003)
(identifying growing caseload concerns as a primary motivator behind the federal courts' cases limiting ERISA preemption, pushing more lawsuits against managed care providers back into state
courts); Paul O'Neil, Protecting ERISA Health Care Claimants: PracticalAssessment of a Neglected Issue in Health Care Reform, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 761-63 (1994) (asserting that concerns
about a burgeoning federal caseload and clogging the federal docket with ERISA claims are a strong
factor in the weakness of the protections provided to plan participants in ERISA litigation); see also
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, COMM. ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, PROPOSED

LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 23, 34-37 (1995) (identifying the removal of many
ERISA claims to state court as a means of reducing crowded dockets); Crespo v. Candela Laser
Corp., 780 F. Supp. 866, 867 (D. Mass. 1992) ("ERISA cases generally ... constitute a burgeoning
area of federal courts' caseload."); David Greenwald & Frederick A. 0. Schwarz, Jr., The Censorial
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The decision to use the LMRA's arbitrary and capricious standard
in ERISA denial of benefits litigation was inappropriate.34 First, ERISA
contains specific provisions creating private rights of action, 35 obviating
the need to create a justification for judicial review. Second, LMRA
trustee boards are composed of equal numbers of representatives from
the employer and from the employee's union,36 while the administrators
of ERISA plans are composed entirely of individuals chosen by the employer or the health insurance company managing the plan. 37 Third, federal policy under the LMRA favored the arbitration of labor disputes,
while ERISA was designed to create and ensure access to the federal
38
courts for plan participants.
The arbitrary and capricious standard defined ERISA's denial of
benefits litigation for fifteen years. "Although it is an overstatement to
say that a decision is not arbitrary or capricious whenever a court can review the reasons stated for the decision without a loud guffaw, it is not
much of an overstatement. ' ,39 The circuit courts produced a variety of
40
tests under the standard-whether the decision was reasonable, supported by evidence, 4' rational,42 in good faith,43 not contrary to the plain

Judiciary,35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2002) ("The 1960s and 1970s saw a large increase in
the number of laws (e.g., civil rights laws, environmental laws, ERISA) and private causes of action
thereunder, which increased the caseloads of the district courts and those of the circuit courts in
turn."); Jay Conison, Suits for Benefits Under ERISA, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 61 (1992) ("[C]aseload
reduction is not a value easily reconciled with ERISA."); Thomas J. Meskill, Caseload Growth.
Struggle to Keep the Pace, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 299, 300 (1991) (listing ERISA as one piece of federal law that has spurred significant litigation in the federal courts). This is not an isolated instance
of the placement of procedural barriers as a response to apprehensions of a particular class of litigation overrunning the courts. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading,45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 987, 1020-32, 1059-61 (2003) (presenting a thorough review of the inappropriate judicial application of heightened pleading in a wide variety of cases, and noting that "[t]he perceptions of
federal court judges about frivolous cases, protection of defendants, and need for docket control
obviously contribute to their search for quick alternatives.").
34. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 110 (holding that "[w]ithout this jurisdictional analogy, LMRA
principles offer no support for the adoption of the arbitrary and capricious standard ....
35. ERISA § 502(a)(3).
36. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5)(B) (2006).
37. See O'Neil, supra note 33, at 746-47 (identifying the differing composition of administrative boards as a reason for the inappropriateness of the importation of the arbitrary and capricious
standard from the LMRA to ERISA).
38. ERISA § 2(b) ("It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect ... the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries .. .by providing for...
ready access to the Federal courts."). See Flint, supra note 4, at 1020-21 (identifying the differing
dispute resolution goals of the LMRA and ERISA).
39. Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985).
40. See, e.g., Bayles v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund, 602 F.2d 97, 100 (5th
Cir. 1979).
41. See, e.g., Niagara of Wis. Paper Corp. v. Paper Indus. Union Mgmt. Pension Fund, 800
F.2d 742, 746 (8th Cir. 1986).
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language of the plan,4 4 or wrong on the law.45 These tests are all very
deferential and lacking concern for conflicts of interest.

III. FIRESTONE
In 1989, the Supreme Court unanimously 46 tossed fifteen years of
arbitrary and capricious review of ERISA denial of benefits claims.47
A. The Holding of Firestone

The Court first considered whether the arbitrary and capricious
standard was appropriate for ERISA,4 8 and unanimously held that since
ERISA provides an explicit right of action against plan fiduciaries, 49 the

jurisdictional reason for the use of the arbitrary and capricious standard
in the LMRA is not present. 50 The Court therefore needed to determine

the proper standard of review. Based on both statutory language 51 and
legislative history, 52 the Court used trust law to guide this determination.53

The default standard of review for trust law decisions is de novo,54
and a court is to construe the trust agreement without any deference to

42. See, e.g., Rueda v. Seafarers Int'l Union, 576 F.2d 939, 942 (1st Cir. 1978).
43. See, e.g., Stanton v. GulfOil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 434 (4th Cir. 1986).
44. See, e.g., Hancock v. Montgomery Ward Long Term Disability Trust, 787 F.2d 1302,
1307 (9th Cir. 1986).
45. See, e.g., Harm v. Bay Area Pipe Trades Pension Plan Trust Fund, 701 F.2d 1301, 1304
(9th Cir. 1983).
46. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 104 (1989). Justice Scalia filed a
separate opinion that did not concur with Part III of the Court's opinion, which dealt with the meaning of the word "participant." Id. at 119-20 (Scalia, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 110.
48. Id. at 109-10.
49. Id. at 110 ("Unlike the LMRA, ERISA explicitly authorizes suits against fiduciaries and
plan administrators to remedy statutory violations, including breaches of fiduciary duty and lack of
compliance with benefit plans.").
50. Id. at 110 ("Thus, the raison d'etre for the LMRA arbitrary and capricious standard-the
need for ajurisdictional basis in suits against trustees-is not present in ERISA.").
51. Id. at 110 ("ERISA abounds with the language of terminology of trust law.").
52. Id. at 110 ("ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility
provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114, 'codifly] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain
principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."' (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 11
(1973))).
53. Id. at 111 ("In determining the appropriate standard of review for action under §
1132(a)(1)(B), we are guided by principles of trust law.").
54. Id. at 112. (noting that "settled principles of trust law, which point to a de novo review of
benefit eligibility determinations based on plan interpretations, belie this contention [that a more
relaxed standard of review is inherently applicable].").
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either party's preferred reading. 55 This is consistent with pre-ERISA
judicial interpretations of employee benefit plans. 56 Firestone and amici
curiae argued that the de novo standard was improper for policy reasons,57 but the court found these arguments unpersuasive.58 The de novo
standard of review is the default for any ERISA plan, regardless of
whether or not there is a conflict of interest. 59 However, the terms of a
trust agreement can alter this standard by giving the fiduciary discretion
with regards to interpretation and implementation of the plan. 60 When
the administrator is given discretion, judgments made pursuant to that
discretion are not disturbed when reasonable. 61 The Court looks to the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts, which instructs "[w]here discretion is
conferred upon the trustee with respect to the exercise of a power, its exercise is not subject to control by the court, except to prevent an abuse
by the trustee of his discretion. 62 The Court does not make a bare reference to the name of the standard of review from the Restatement, but also looks at the commentary to the Restatement for what shape this abuse
of discretion review should take.6 3 The Court makes a particular point of
noting that conflicts of interest on the part of the ERISA plan administrator must be taken into account when reviewing that administrator's decisions for an abuse of discretion.6 4
55. Id.
As they do with contractual provisions, courts construe terms in trust agreements without
deferring to either party's interpretation. "The extent of the duties and powers of a trustee is determined by the rules of law that are applicable to the situation, and not the rules
that the trustee or his attorney believes to be applicable, and by the terms of the trust as
the court may interpret them, and not as they may be interpreted by the trustee himself or
by his attorney."
Id. (quoting 3 W. FRATCHER, SCOTT ON TRUSTS § 201 at 221 (4th ed. 1980)).
56. Id. at 112 ("The trust law de novo standard of review is consistent with the judicial interpretation of employee benefit plans prior to the enactment of ERISA.").
57. Id. at 113-14 (asserting that general statutory language, Congressional inaction and the
need to promote corporate willingness to create employee benefit plans all demanded a default standard more lenient than de novo review).
58. Id. (holding that the use of de novo review was favored by ERISA's public policy to promote protection of workers' benefits and by the fact that using arbitrary and capricious review
would afford less protection than workers enjoyed before ERISA was enacted).
59. Id. at 115 ("[F]or purposes of actions under § 1132(a)(l)(B), the de novo standard of review applies regardless of whether the plan at issue is funded or unfunded and regardless of whether
the administrator or fiduciary is operating under a possible or actual conflict of interest.").
60. Id. at II1 ("Trust principles make a deferential standard of review appropriate when a
trustee exercises discretionary powers." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959))).
61. Id. at Ill ("A trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful terms, and in
such circumstances the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable." (citing G.
BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 559, at 169-71 (2d rev. ed. 1980))).
62. Id. at Ill (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959)).
63. Id. at 115.
64. Id. ("[Ihf a benefit plan gives discretion to an administrator or fiduciary who is operating
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B. The Lesson of Firestone
While the default standard of review for denial of benefits cases
under ERISA may be de novo, 65 most fiduciaries adjusted plan language
in order to grant discretion. 66 Firestone and the Restatement (Second) of
Trusts can be examined for guidance regarding performing abuse of discretion review, so as to provide a measuring stick against which later
cases in the circuit courts can be judged.6 7
In Firestone, the court rejected the use of arbitrary and capricious,6 8
and replaced it with abuse of discretion review. 69 Firestone asserted that,
despite a default de novo review standard, 70 it should be subject to arbitrary and capricious review, but the Court rejected this position. 71 Lower
courts should as well.
The Restatement lists six factors that, according to the circumstances, may be relevant in determining whether the trustee has committed an abuse of discretion. 72 These six factors are (1) the extent of the
discretion conferred on the trustee, 73 (2) the purposes of the trust, 74 (3)
the nature of the power, 75 (4) external standards against which the trustee's conduct can be judged, 76 (5) the trustee's motive in making the de-

under a conflict of interest, that conflict must be weighed as a 'facto[r] in determining whether there
is an abuse of discretion."' (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (1959))).
65. Id. at 112.
66. See Dana M. Muir, Fiduciary Status As An Employer's Shield. The Perversity of ERISA
FiduciaryLaw, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 391, 411-14 (2000) (discussing how basing whether or
not the plan administrator has discretion on the plan document gives said administrator complete
control over the standard of review its actions will face); O'Neil, supra note 33, at 747-51 (expressing disappointment at the ease with which plans can avoid facing de novo review).
67.

See also G. BOGERT & G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, § 559, at 169-71 (2d

rev. ed. 1980) (for the notion that the trustee's decision be overturned on the basis of reasonableness). Unfortunately, unlike the Restatement, this work does not provide any further guidance on
the subject, making it an unhelpful resource.
68. Firestone,489 U.S. at 109-10.
69. Id. at 113-16.
70. Id. at 113 ("Despite these principles of trust law pointing to a de novo standard of review
for claims like respondents'....").
71. Id. at 113-14 ("[F]irestone would have us read ERISA to require the application of the
arbitrary and capricious standard to such claims .... Firestone maintains that congressional action
after the passage of ERISA indicates that Congress intended ERISA claims to be reviewed under the
arbitrary and capricious standard.").
72.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).

73. Id. (providing, "the extent of the discretion conferred upon the trustee by the terms of the
trust").
74. Id. (providing "the purposes of the trust").
75. Id. (providing "the nature of the power").
76. Id. (providing "the existence or nonexistence, the definiteness or indefiniteness, of an external standard by which the reasonableness of the trustee's conduct can be judged").
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cision,77 and (6) whether or not the trustee is operating under a conflict
of interest.78
Of these, the most important is the presence of any conflicts of interest on the part of the plan fiduciary. While ERISA allows for conflicted plan fiduciaries, 9 they are strongly disfavored under the law of
trusts. 80 Therefore, it is no coincidence that this factor was the impetus
for the Third Circuit decision leading to Firestone8 1 and was singled out
8 2 and later cases.83 In addition, the
by the Supreme Court in Firestone
commentary to the Restatement contains additional comments dealing
with conflicted fiduciaries. 84 In the Restatement, the necessity of considering a conflict of interest even where it cannot be shown that the conflict affected the fiduciary's decision is demonstrated by the presence of
distinct provisions that a conflict of interest is a factor in the abuse of
discretion analysis and a stronger provision dealing with the situation
where it can be shown that a conflict guided the fiduciary's decision. 85
Based on guidelines from the Court, proper abuse of discretion review should: (1) not simply substitute arbitrary and capricious for abuse
of discretion, (2) take into account relevant Restatement factors, and (3)
give weight to any conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary, even
when the claimant cannot prove that the conflict guided the fiduciary's
decision.
IV. AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION: JUDICIAL REVIEW POST-FIRESTONE

Having rejected arbitrary and capricious review in ERISA denial of

77. Id. (providing "the motives of the trustee in exercising or refraining from exercising the
power").
78. Id. (providing "the existence or nonexistence of an interest in the trustee conflicting with
that of the beneficiaries").
79. See Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 3, 29 U.S.C. § 1002
(2006) (using the plan sponsor as plan administrator by default).
80. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (1959).
81. Bruch v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 828 F.2d 134, 137-45 (1987).
82. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).
83. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 219-20 (2000) (noting the potential for conflicts of
interest inherent in the HMO system); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 n.15
(2002) ("[I]mplicated by this case ... is the degree to which a plan provision for unfettered discretion in benefit determinations guarantees truly deferential review, In Firestone Tire itself, we noted
that review for abuse of discretion would hone in on any conflict of interest on the plan fiduciary's
part, if a conflict was plausibly raised.").
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmts. f-g (1959). In instances where the beneficiary can actually prove that the fiduciary acted dishonestly, or with improper motive, the court is
free to impose its will on the fiduciary. Id.
85. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959), with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. g (1959).
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benefits claims,86 and presented guidelines for abuse of discretion review
of those claims, 87 the Supreme Court handed the matter back to the circuit courts . 8 Despite the Supreme Court's rejection of the arbitrary and

capricious standard, most of the circuits have simply equated Firestone
abuse of discretion with the pre-Firestone arbitrary and capricious.
While this is an improper identification, this misidentification has not
always generated an inappropriate substantive standard, as some-circuits
kept the name "arbitrary and capricious" while changing the nature of
the test. What follows is a circuit-by-circuit review of the assorted standards and tests the lower courts have devised for denial of benefits
claims against ERISA plan fiduciaries.
A. D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit considered the arbitrary and capricious and abuse
of discretion standards to be interchangeable. 89 Either way, the circuit
stated, it was really a "reasonableness" standard. 90
B. First Circuit
The First Circuit took the position that Firestone established "same
standard for review of trustees' discretionary actions under ERISA as for
review of trustees' actions under LMRA." 9 1 As such, it was not surprising that the First Circuit at first did not even discuss whether the "abuse
of discretion" and "arbitrary and capricious" standards were equivalent,
but simply continued to use arbitrary and capricious. 92 It later came to
use the two interchangeably. 93 In applying this standard, the circuit had,

86.

Firestone,489 U.S. at 109-10.

87.
88.

Id. at 113-16
Id. at 118.

89. Block v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 952 F.2d 1450, 1454 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J.) ("[W]e
are satisfied, there is no need to adopt one phrase and avoid the other."); Wagener v. SBC Pension

Benefit Plan - Non Bargained Program, 407 F.3d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (conflating abuse of
discretion and arbitrary and capricious standards); Moore v. CapitalCare, Inc., 461 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C.

Cir. 2006) (opining that the Firestonecourt had described the standard as abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious).
90. Block, 952 F.2d at 1454 ("The reasonableness of the Plan Committee's decision is our

polestar .... "); Wagener, 407 F.3d at 402 (using reasonableness and finding discriminatory behavior clearly unreasonable); Moore, 461 F.3d at 11 (applying a reasonableness standard).
91.
92.

Mahoney v. Bd. of Trs., 973 F.2d 968, 972 (1st Cir. 1992).
Id. at 971-73; see Recupero v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 118 F.3d 820, 827 (lst Cir.

1997) ("Firestoneand its progeny mandate a deferential 'arbitrary and capricious' standard ofjudicial review.").
93. See Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 37 n.6 (1st Cir. 1998) ("There is no need to adopt
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from its first post-Firestone ERISA denial of benefits case, 94 simply reviewed the plan administrator's decision for reasonableness; 95 "an unof disreasonable determination would necessarily constitute an abuse
96
not."
would
necessarily
determination
reasonable
a
and
cretion,
The First Circuit adopted an arbitrary and capricious test with
"more bite" for a conflict, 97 meaning that the court would place a "special emphasis" on reasonableness, but that the claimant retains the burden of showing that the fiduciary's decision was "improperly moti-

vated." 98 It was "not enough," however, that the fiduciary must pay the
benefits out of its own pocket, and in such 99a case the circuit proceeded
without further consideration of the conflict.
C. Second Circuit

The Second Circuit applied an arbitrary and capricious standard in
ERISA denial of benefits cases, t 0° holding that the court "may overturn a
one phrase and avoid the other. The reasonableness of the Plan Committee's decision is our polestar
.. (citing Block, 952 F.2d at 1454)).
94. Curtis v. Noel, 877 F.2d 159, 161 (1st Cir. 1989) ("A trustee may be given power to construe disputed or doubtful terms, and in such instances the trustee's interpretation will not be disturbed if reasonable." (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 111 (1989))).
95. See Terry, 145 F.3d at 40 ("Rather, in the ERISA context, it has been stated that under the
arbitrary and capricious standard, 'a fiduciary's interpretation of a plan will not be disturbed if reasonable."'); Dandurand v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 284 F.3d 331, 335-36 (1st Cir. 2002) ("[T]he
proper standard for reviewing the decision of an insurer that has such discretionary authority is the
arbitrary and capricious standard, but that 'the reasonableness of the insurer's decision determines
whether or not it constituted an abuse of the discretion vested in the insurer by the plan ....' (quoting Pari-Fasano v. ITT Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 415, 419 (1st Cir. 2000)));
Cook v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 320 F.3d 11, 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (equating arbitrary and capricious with unreasonableness). But see Doyle v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 144 F.3d 181, 183 (1st
Cir. 1998) (noting that the District Court's "[D]ecision must be upheld unless 'arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion.' This standard means that its decision will be upheld if it was within Paul
Revere's authority, reasoned, and 'supported by substantial evidence . . . .' Substantial evidence, in
turn, means evidence reasonably sufficient to support a conclusion.") (citations omitted).
96. Pari-Fasano,230 F.3d 415,419 (lst Cir. 2000).
97. Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184 ("The Massachusetts district court has prophesied that in case of
conflict our court would merely give more bite to the arbitrary and capricious standard. We so do..
• ."1).

98. Id. ("[lI]nterpreting 'more bite' as adhering to, the arbitrary and capricious principle, with
special emphasis on reasonableness, but with the burden on the claimant to show that the decision
was improperly motivated."); see also Doe v. Travelers Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 53, 57 (1st Cir. 1999) ("It
seems to us that the requirement that [the fiduciary's] decision be 'reasonable' is the basic touchstone in a case of this kind.").
99. Doyle, 144 F.3d at 184-86. It is not fair to say that the court proceeded with its arbitrary
and capricious review "as normal" because the First Circuit, for the first time in an arbitrary and
capricious case, defines a more tangible measure of that standard and takes a significant look at the
evidence upon which the fiduciary based its decision. See id. at 185-86.
100. Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[W]here the written
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decision to deny benefits only if it was 'without reason, unsupported by
substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law."'"° While the arbitrary and capricious standard was applied consistently before 1995,102
the three-factor test found in Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan'0 3 became
the lodestar application of the test.1 4 The final addition to the test, used
in cases without conflicts of interest, was a precise definition of substantial evidence as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. 0 5
In addition to establishing the Second Circuit's default standard of
review, Pagan more ominously set the stage for the Second Circuit's
treatment of conflicts of interest, dismissing such a conflict because the
claimant could not show that the reasonableness of the fiduciary's decision was affected. 10 6 Pagan was later ratified and expanded by Sullivan
v. LTV Aerospace & Defense Co.,10 7 which expressed the position more

emphatically, and in particular made a point that paying claims out of
company assets created an inherent conflict of interest that needed to be
weighed as a factor. 10 8 While sometimes described as a burden shifting
plan documents confer upon a plan administrator the discretionary authority to determine eligibility,
we will not disturb the administrator's ultimate conclusion unless it is arbitrary and capricious.").
101. Id. at 442 (quoting Abnathya v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993)).
102. See, e.g., Murphy v. IBM Corp., 23 F.3d 719, 721 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Where an ERISAcovered benefit plan gives the plan administrator discretionary authority to determine eligibility for
benefits, the administrator's decision will not be disturbed unless it is arbitrary and capricious.");
John Blair Commc'n Profit Sharing Plan v. Telemundo Group, 26 F.3d 360, 369 (2d Cir. 1994) (In
Firestone "the Court stated if the terms of the plan accorded the administrator discretion in such
matters, the decision should be upheld unless arbitrary and capricious."); Reichelt v. Emhart Corp.,
921 F.2d 425, 431 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that Firestone's holding was that an "arbitrary-andcapricious standard applies to review of denial of ERISA benefits where benefit plan gives plan
administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to construe plan's terms or to determine eligibility
for benefits.").
103. 52 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 1995).
104. See, e.g., O'Shea v. First Manhattan Co. Thrift Plan & Trust, 55 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir.
1995) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Sullivan
v. LTV Aerospace & Def. Co., 82 F.3d 1251, 1255 (2d Cir. 1996) (where the Court followed the
standard of Pagan). But see Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 406 F.3d 98, 108 (2d Cir. 2005)
(noting the "abuse of discretion" standard).
105. Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Substantial evidence
in turn 'is such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion
reached by the [decisionmaker and] . . . requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance."' (quoting Sanodval v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 377, 382 (10th Cir. 1992))).
106. Pagan, 52 F.3d at 443 ("Nor does Pagan's argument that the presence of a potential conflict of interest warrant a different conclusion. Pagan fails to explain how such an alleged conflict
affected the reasonableness of the Committee's decision. Accordingly, we reject her contention.")
(citations omitted).
107. 82 F.3d 1251 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Whitney v. Empire Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 106
F.3d 475, 477 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1255-56); DeFelice v. Am. Int'l Life Assurance Co., 112 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 1997).
108. See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1255 (distancing the Second Circuit from the Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561-68 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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test,'0 9 the reality was that under Sullivan, conflicts of interest were ef-

fectively rendered irrelevant, being disregarded unless the claimant
could perform the nearly impossible task of proving (without discovery)
0
"that the administrator was in fact influenced by such conflict.""1
D. Third Circuit
The Third Circuit applied an arbitrary and capricious standard in

ERISA denial of benefits cases, allowing a plan administrator's decision
to be overturned if "without reason, unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.""' It took the circuit many years to settle on
2
this version of arbitrary and capricious review."1
The Third Circuit employed a standard that actually gave weight to
conflicts of interest on the part of the ERISA plan fiduciary. After a
false start," 13 the circuit produced an expansive and well-considered decision concerning how to best deal with conflicts of interest in ERISA
denial of benefits decisions. 1 4 In Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 1 5 the court adopted a sliding scale approach to conflicts of in-

terest

16

since this approach better reflected the Supreme Court's

The Sullivan court also rejected the burden-shifting approach that some other circuits would adopt.
See Sullivan, 82 F.3d at 1259.
109. See, e.g., Pinto v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 377, 391 (3d Cir. 2000) (referring to the approach used by the Second Circuit in Sullivan as a burden shifting model).
110. Sullivan, 82 F.3dat 1255-56.
111. Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, 'the district court may overturn a decision of the Plan administrator only if
it is without reason, unsupported by the evidence or erroneous as a matter of law."' (citing Abnathya v. Hofflnann-LaRoche, Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993))). But see Harte v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 214 F.3d 446, 449 n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying arbitrary and capricious review without using
any particular specification).
112. The Third Circuit decided several cases using an unspecified arbitrary and capricious
standard. See, e.g., Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1335-36 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying arbitrary and
capricious without further elaboration). This Circuit also used a variety of more particular standards
that it later abandoned. See, e.g., Moats v. United Mine Workers of Am. Health & Ret. Funds, 981
F.2d 685, 687-88 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[A] decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is 'not rational and
based on consideration of the relevant factors'. . . . [T]he trustees' interpretation 'should be upheld.
. so long as the interpretation is rationally related to a valid plan purpose and not contrary to the
plain language of the plan."' (quoting Gaines v. Amalgamated Ins. Fund, 753 F.2d 288, 289 (3d Cir.
1985))); Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 4 F.3d 1137, 1141 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that decisions
are to be upheld unless in clear error or not rational); Moench v. Roberston, 62 F.3d 553, 566 (3d
Cir. 1995) (applying a five factor test to evaluate an administrator's plan interpretation).
113. See Harte, 214 F.3d at 449 n.2 (rejecting the use of anything other than the full arbitrary
and capricious standard absent evidence that bias influenced an administrator's decision).
114. Pinto, 214 F.3d at 382-93.
115. 214 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2000).
116. Id. at 393 ("[W]e adopt the sliding scale approach .... "); see Stratton v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 363 F.3d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (applying sliding scale standard); Smathers v.
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mandate to consider conflicts of interest as a factor.11 7 Scrutiny was to
be handled by treating the standard of review as a range rather than a
point, "calibrating the intensity of our review to the intensity of the conflict."' 1 8 The circuit even provided specific factors for the reviewing
court to consider in determining how serious the conflict is. These included the sophistication of the parties, the information accessible to the
parties, the exact financial arrangement between the insurer and the
company, and (if the fiduciary is an employer) the fiduciary's long-term
interests in keeping employees happy. 119 In addition, the Third Circuit
company acting as an ERISA
in Pinto acknowledged that an insurance
120
conflicted.
generally
is
fiduciary
E. Fourth Circuit
Quickly holding that arbitrary and capricious review had been rendered inappropriate, 12 the Fourth Circuit always applied an abuse of
22
The
discretion standard to ERISA denial of benefits after Firestone.
Fourth Circuit noted that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review

Multi-Tool, Inc., 298 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting sliding scale standard and the District
Court's finding of no conflict).
117. Pinto, 214 F.3d at 392 (finding that "the sliding scale approach better adheres to Firestone's dictate that a conflict should be considered as a 'factor' in applying the arbitrary and capricious standard.").
118. Id. at 393 (holding that "we can find no better method to reconcile Firestone's dual commands than to apply the arbitrary and capricious standard, and integrate conflicts as factors in applying that standard, approximately calibrating the intensity of our review to the intensity of the conflict.").
119. Id. at 392 ("The court may take into account the sophistication of the parties, the information accessible to the parties, and the exact financial arrangement between the insurer and the company ....Another factor to be considered is the current status of the fiduciary.").
120. Id. at 383-84 ("Third, the employer may pay an independent insurance company to fund,
interpret, and administer a plan .... [T]oday we address the third arrangement for the first time,
concluding that it generally presents a conflict and thus invites a heightened standard of review.").
121. Boyd v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers Health & Ret. Funds, 873 F.2d 57, 59 (4th Cir.
1989) ("Until the Supreme Court's recent decision in Firestone,the standard for reviewing Trustees'
disability decisions under this pension plan was, in this and most other circuits, whether the decision
was arbitrary or capricious. [Firestone]made that no longer appropriate.") (citation omitted).
122. Id. ("Where the administrator or fiduciary has discretionary authority, an abuse of discretion standard should apply. That standard now controls our review here.") (citation omitted); see
also De Nobel v. Vitro Corp., 885 F.2d 1180, 1186-87 (4th Cir. 1989) ("If the plan's fiduciaries are
indeed entitled to exercise discretion of that sort, reviewing courts may disturb the challenged denial
of benefits only upon a showing of procedural or substantive abuse ....[W]e are compelled under
");Gauer
[Firestone's]express mandate to apply the deferential 'abuse of discretion' standard ....
v. Connors, 953 F.2d 97, 99-100 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that the appropriate standard of review is
abuse of discretion standard rather than arbitrary and capricious standard); Bedrick v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 93 F.3d 149, 152-55 (4th Cir. 1996).
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was more deferential than the proper abuse of discretion standard. 123 For
pure medical claim cases, abuse of discretion review was often applied
by asking whether the denial was the result of a reasoned, principled decisionmaking process and supported by substantial evidence. 24 For the
remaining cases, the Fourth Circuit produced a variety of tests, such as
the abuse of discretion without further nuance test, 125 the reasonableness
five-factor reasonableness test, 127 or an
without specification test, 126 a 128
eight-factor reasonableness test.
While the Fourth Circuit was not monolithic in its generic application of the abuse of discretion standard, it had produced a unified means
of dealing with conflicts of interest in ERISA denial of benefits cases.
The circuit applied a sliding scale, reducing deference to the degree ne123. Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assocs. Health & Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335, 341 (4th
Cir. 2000) ("First, we continue to recognize that an 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is more deferential to the fiduciary than is an 'abuse of discretion' standard.").
124. See Bemstein v. Capitalcare, Inc., 70 F.3d 783, 790 (4th Cir. 1995) (assessing a medical
coverage determination based on whether the decision was supported by substantial evidence and
resulted from a deliberate, reasoned process); Bynum v. CIGNA Healthcare of N.C., Inc., 287 F.3d
305, 311 (4th Cir. 2002). See also Bedrick, 93 F.3d at 152-55 (overturning insurance company's
decision denying benefits to child with cerebral palsy based solely on the statement of a companyemployed doctor who had not practiced in seven years, and had never been an expert on cerebral
palsy).
125. See, e.g., Bailey v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., 67 F.3d 53, 56 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting abuse of discretion standard without any enumerated factors); Rego v. Westvaco Corp., 319
F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2003).
126. See Hale v. Trs. of the United Mine Workers Health & Ret. Funds, 23 F.3d 899, 901 (4th
Cir. 1994) (noting that an administrator's decision will not be disturbed if reasonable); Colucci v.
Agfa Corp. Severance Pay Plan, 431 F.3d 170, 176-78 (4th Cit 2005).
127. See, e.g., De Nobel, 885 F.2d, 1180, 1187-88 (applying abuse of discretion by determining
reasonableness, considering whether the decision was consistent with the goals of the plan, might
render plan language meaningless or internally inconsistent, was at odds with the procedural or
substantive requirements of ERISA, was consistent with prior decisions, or was consistent with the
clear language of the plan); Lockhart v. United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension Trust, 5 F.3d
74, 77 (4th Cir. 1993) (applying the five De Nobel factors). The Circuit has also used just one of
these factors, without mentioning the others, to strike down a decision. See, e.g., Cotter v. E. Conference of Teamsters Ret. Plan, 898 F.2d 424, 427-28 (4th Cir. 1990) (striking down a fiduciary's
plan interpretation as an abuse of discretion because it produced a forfeiture of vested benefits,
which is impermissible under the explicit statutory commands of 29 U.S.C. section 1053(a)).
128. Booth, 201 F.3d at 342-43 ("Combining these various criteria [De Nobel, the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts, Firestone, and other Fourth Circuit cases] for determining the reasonableness of
a fiduciary's discretionary decision, we conclude that a court may consider, but is not limited to,
such factors as: (1) the language of the plan; (2) the purposes and goals of the plan; (3) the adequacy
of the materials considered to make the decision and the degree to which they support it; (4) whether the fiduciary's interpretation was consistent with other provisions in the plan and with earlier
interpretations of the plan; (5) whether the decisionmaking process was reasoned and principled; (6)
whether the decision was consistent with the procedural and substantive requirements of ERISA; (7)
any external standards relevant to the exercise of discretion; and (8) the fiduciary's motives and any
conflict of interest it may have."). See also Myers v. Hercules, Inc., 253 F.3d 761, 766 (4th Cir.
2001) (noting Booth's eight-factor test).
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cessary to neutralize the untoward influence of the conflict.12 9 In addi-

tion, an insurer making benefits determinations and paying claims out of
company coffers30was considered to be operating under a substantial conflict of interest.
F. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit never settled on whether arbitrary and capricious
or abuse of discretion review was appropriate for ERISA denial of bene-

fits cases, or whether the two standards are interchangeable. Each of
these positions was supported by a series of cases, many of which cite 131
to
position.
own
their
of
support
in
cases
of
line
contradictory
other,
the
Whatever language the circuit chose to apply in a particular instance, a
case would probably be analyzed using a two-step approach. 132 First

129. Doe v. Group Hospitalization & Med. Servs., 3 F.3d 80, 85-87 (4th Cir. 1993). The court
does not refer to it as a sliding scale standard, and actually cites to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Brown, which applied a burden-shifting standard. Id. at 87. Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit in Doe
reduced the deference given to the insurance company, rather than shifting the burden to the insurance company to prove that it was not affected by the conflict. Id. at 87 ("[T]his deference will be
lessened to the degree necessary to neutralize any untoward influence resulting from the conflict..
•With that lessened degree of deference to Blue Cross' discretionary interpretation of the group
insurance contract, we turn to review Blue Cross' decision to deny benefits."). See also Bedrick, 93
F.3d at 152, 154 (noting that deference must be reduced to neutralize fiduciary conflict of interest);
Stupp v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 390 F.3d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 2004).
130. Doe, 3 F.3d at 86. The court specifically noted this conflict in deciding against the insurer, "we conclude Blue Cross abused its discretion, particularly when we factor into our review the
less deferential standard applied by reason of Blue Cross' financial interest in the outcome of its
decision." Id. at 89.
131. See Batchelor v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 861 Pension & Ret. Fund, 877 F.2d
441, 444 n.10 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting arbitrary and capricious in favor of abuse of discretion);
Penn v. Howe-Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 898 F.2d 1096, 1100 n.2A (5th Cir. 1990) (conflating the abuse
of discretion and arbitrary and capricious standards); Pierre v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 932 F.2d
1552, 1562 (5th Cir. 1991). See also Vercher v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 379 F.3d 222, 226
(5th Cit. 2004) (applying abuse of discretion review and expressly following the Pierre standard);
Vasseur v. Halliburton Co., 950 F.2d 1002, 1006 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying arbitrary and capricious
review and citing Pierre); Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, IBEW No. 995, 954 F.2d 1116,
1121 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying abuse of discretion review); Wildbur v. Arco Chem. Co., 974 F.2d
631, 636-37 (5th Cir. 1992) (applying abuse of discretion review); Meditrust Fin. Servs. Corp. v.
Sterling Chems., Inc., 168 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying arbitrary and capricious review
and expressly rejecting the standard articulated in Pierre); Chacko v. Sabre, Inc., 473 F.3d 604, 609
(5th Cir. 2006) (applying abuse of discretion review). See also Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Servs., 145
F.3d 673, 677 (5th Cir. 1998) (conflating abuse of discretion and arbitrary and capricious review).
132. Batchelor, 877 F.2d at 444 (holding that "a district court 'should engage in a two step
process. First, the court must determine the [legally] correct interpretation of the Plan's provisions.
Second, the court must determine whether the Plan administrators acted arbitrarily or capriciously in
light of the interpretation they gave the Plan in the particular instance."' (quoting Denton v. First
Nat'l Bank of Waco, 765 F.2d 1295, 1304 (5th Cir. 1985))); Washington v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc.,
497 F.3d 453, 455 (5th Cir. 2007) ("Those determinations [of an ERISA administrator] are granted
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three factors were applied uniformity of interpretation, whether the reading of the plan was fair and reasonable, and unanticipated costs that
could result from the interpretation-to determine the correct interpretation. 133 Then, if the actual decision being reviewed differed, another
three factors were applied' 34-internal consistency, relevant regulations,
and factual background-to determine if the discrepancy constituted an
abuse of discretion. 135
From its first post-Firestone case on point, the Fifth Circuit held
that under a conflict of interest, the standard of review is a range rather
than a point, with the sliding scale varying on how strong the suspicion
13 6
of bias is.

G. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit consistently applied the arbitrary and capricious
standard from its first post-Firestone review of an ERISA fiduciary's
discretionary decision denying benefits to a claimant.' 37 When the circuit did give further specification of this standard it required either a reasoned explanation based on the evidence, 38 rationality in light of the
deference using a two-step process. First, the court determines whether the administrator's interpretation of the plan was legally correct. If so, then the inquiry ends. If not, the court then determines
whether that interpretation constitutes an abuse of discretion." (citing Rhorer v. Raytheon Eng'rs &
Constructors, Inc., 181 F.3d 634, 639-40 (5th Cir. 1999))).
133. Batchelor, 877 F.2d at 444.
134. Id. at 445.
135. See, e.g., Rhorer, 181 F.3d at 643-44 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying two-step, three-factor
abuse of discretion review); see also Worthy v. New Orleans S.S. Ass'n/Int'l Longshoremen's
Ass'n, 342 F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying two-step, three-factor abuse of discretion review, but finding that administrator's interpretation was correct and therefore not reaching second
inquiry). But see Penn, 898 F.2d at 1100-01 (applying arbitrary and capricious without specification).
136. Lowry v. Bankers Life & Cas. Ret. Plan, 871 F.2d 522, 525 n.6 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting the
use of a sliding scale in conflict of interest cases); see also Vega, 145 F.3d at 677-78 (engaging in a
review of how other circuits treat conflicts of interest, and reaffirming the use of the sliding scale);
MacLachlan v. ExxonMobil Corp., 350 F.3d 472, 478-79 (5th Cir. 2003) (applying sliding scale
deference).
137. E.g., Davis v. Ky. Fin. Cos. Ret. Plan, 887 F.2d 689, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1989) (using arbitrary and capricious review when ERISA plan granted administrator discretion). Contra Baker v.
United Mine Workers Health & Ret. Funds, 929 F.2d 1140, 1144 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Where the administrator or fiduciary has discretionary authority, an abuse of discretion standard applies." (citing
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989))).
138. Davis, 887 F.2d at 693 ("When it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the
evidence, for a particular outcome, that outcome is not arbitrary or capricious."); see also Killian v.
Healthsource Provident Adm'rs., Inc., 152 F.3d 514, 520 (6th Cir. 1998); Calvert v. Firstar Fin.,
Inc., 409 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding the decision to be arbitrary and capricious and not
based on a rational reading of the evidence).
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plan's provisions,

39

or both. 140

When dealing with a conflict of interest, the Sixth Circuit weighed
the conflict as a factor, without giving a more detailed standard.' 4' The
court looked at the sliding scale standard, but rejected it. 142 The Sixth

Circuit held that an insurance company acting as fiduciary inherently
conflict of interest, and its deoperates under a substantial and perpetual
43
cisions must be reviewed accordingly.
H.Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit primarily used the arbitrary and capricious
standard when reviewing the decisions of an ERISA plan fiduciary with
discretion. 144 The circuit had presented some factors to consider on occasion,"4' but mostly applied the standard as one of reasonableness, 46 or

139. Miller v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 925 F.2d 979, 984 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that "an ERISA
benefit plan administrator's decisions on eligibility for benefits are not arbitrary and capricious if
they are 'rational in light of the plan's provisions."' (quoting Daniel v. Eaton Corp., 839 F.2d 263,
267 (6th Cir. 1988))).
140. Gismondi v. United Techs. Corp., 408 F.3d 295, 298 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a decision is not arbitrary and capricious when reasoned and based on the evidence and that decision is
not arbitrary and capricious if it is rational in light of the plan's provisions).
141. See, e.g., Miller, 925 F.2d at 984 (weighing fiduciary's conflict of interest as a factor
without further specification as to the method of so doing); see also Calvert, 409 F.3d at 292-93,
295-96 (noting treatment of conflict as one factor).
142. Peruzzi v. Summa Med. Plan, 137 F.3d 431, 433 (6th Cir. 1998) (rejecting appellants argument that the arbitrary and capricious standard is a range, rather than a point, based on how conflicted the plan fiduciary is).
143. Miller, 925 F.2d at 984 ("Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its
own assets rather than from the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its
profit-making role as a business, and the conflict of interest is substantial .... [A]pplication of the
standard should be shaped by the circumstances of the inherent conflict of interest." (citing Brown
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 898 F.2d 1556, 1561-63 (6th Cir. 1990))); see also Killian, 152 F.3d at 521 ("Healthsource characterizes this situation as giving rise to a 'potential conflict' of interest. This characterization is incorrect: there is an actual, readily apparent conflict here,
not a mere potential for one."); Darland v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 516, 527-28 (6th Cir.
2003) (holding that there is an apparent conflict when an insurance company acting as plan fiduciary pays plan benefits); Calvert,409 F.3d at 292 (noting potential conflict).
144. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Caterpillar, Inc., 914 F.2d 1003, 1004 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing and
remanding a district court's decision because it applied the abuse of discretion standard instead of
arbitrary and capricious); Egert v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1035 (7th Cir. 1990)
(applying arbitrary and capricious review). But see Gallo v. Amoco Corp., 102 F.3d 918, 921 (7th
Cir. 1996) (asking whether the plan administrator "had abused its discretion, or, what amounts to
the same thing, had acted arbitrarily and capriciously ....");Bourke v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp.,
159 F.3d 1032, 1040 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that "such administrative action can only be reviewed if
it is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion.").
145. Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting the following as
factors for review: "the impartiality of the decisionmaking body, the complexity of the issues, the
process afforded the parties, the extent to which the decisionmakers utilized the assistance of ex-
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whether the decision was "downright unreasonable., 147 The Seventh
Circuit buttressed the arbitrary and capricious standard by laying out
several circumstances where a fiduciary's decision may not be overturned. 148 The ERISA claimant could at least hope to reverse the fiduciary decision where it had made a wildly improper decision, 149 contro-

pens where necessary, and finally the soundness of the fiduciary's ratiocination.").
146. See, e.g., Lister v. Stark, 942 F.2d 1183, 1188-89 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing in terms of
reasonableness because the district court had, and holding that a fiduciary must articulate an explanation for its decision that includes a rational connection between the facts and the decision, must
demonstrate that it considered all important aspects of the problem, can offer an explanation consistent with the evidence, and is not so implausible that it cannot be ascribed to differing views by the
experts); Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 658 (7th Cir. 2005) (upholding plan
administrator's decision unless unreasonable).
147. See Tegtmeier v. Midwest Operating Eng'rs Pension Trust Fund, 390 F.3d 1040, 1045
(7th Cir. 2004) (using not just clearly incorrect but "downright unreasonable" as a measure of arbitrary and capricious).
148. There are four such circumstances. The first is where there is a reasoned explanation
based on the evidence. See Exbom v. Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 900
F.2d 1138, 1142 (7th Cir. 1990) ("The arbitrary and capricious standard holds that a trustee's decision shall not be overturned on a § 11 32(a)(I)(B) matter, absent special circumstances such as fraud
or bad faith, if 'it is possible to offer a reasoned explanation, based on the evidence, for a particular
outcome."' (quoting Pokratz v. Jones Dairy Farm, 771 F.2d 206, 209 (7th Cir. 1985))); see also
Houston v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 2004) (arbitrary and
capricious standard only requires that the plan administrator offer a reasoned explanation, supported
by the evidence, for its decision); Hackett v. Xerox Corp. Long-Term Disability Income Plan, 315
F.3d 771, 774-75 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Even under the deferential review we will not uphold a termination when there is an absence of reasoning in the record to support it."). The second circumstance is
where the decision was based on relevant factors concerning the important part of the issue. See,
e.g., Exbom, 900 F.2d at 1143 ("Nor will it [set aside the denial of a claim] ... where the trustee has
based its decision 'on a consideration of the relevant factor's that 'encompass the important aspect[s] of the problem' before it.") (citations omitted). The third circumstance is where there is a
rational connection between the evidence, the plain text, and the conclusion reached. See, e.g., Exbom, 900 F.2d at 1143 ("If the trustee makes an informed judgment and articulates an explanation
for it that is satisfactory in light of the relevant facts, i.e., one that makes a "rational connection"
between the issue to be decided, the evidence in the case, the text under consideration, and the conclusion reached, then the trustee's decision is final."). See also Dabertin v. HCR Manor Care, Inc.,
373 F.3d 822, 827-28 (7th Cir. 2004) (using the finding of a rational connection between facts, plan
language and the final decision as a mark for the absence of an arbitrary or capricious decision);
Loyola Univ. v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding no arbitrary and capricious behavior when the fiduciary makes an informed decision and can provide an explanation that
is satisfactory in light of the evidence). The fourth is where the fiduciary did not overlook something important or seriously err in assessing the evidence. See, e.g., Patterson v. Caterpillar, Inc., 70
F.3d 503, 505 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Before concluding that a decision was arbitrary and capricious, a
court must be very confident that the decisionmaker overlooked something important or seriously
erred in appreciating the significance of the evidence.").
149. See, e.g., Trombetta v. Cragin Fed. Bank for Sav. Employee Stock Ownership Plan, 102
F.3d 1435, 1438 (7th Cir. 1996).
A decision is arbitrary or capricious only when the decisionmaker "has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the
evidence ... , or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to difference in view or
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verted the plain meaning of the plan,15 ° or defied common sense. 15 1
The Seventh Circuit employed an arbitrary and capricious standard
with "more bite" when there was a conflict, adjusting the deference in
accordance with how serious the conflict is.' 52 However, the circuit
found no conflict (or at least no serious conflict) when a company paid
benefits for an unfounded plan, based largely on the suspect reasoning
that the company's overall revenues are large compared to an individual
benefit claim. 53 The circuit extended this to include insurers who pay
benefits claims out-of-pocket. 54 Instead, claimants are required55 to provide specific evidence of a conflict before it will be considered.
the product of ...expertise."

Id. (quoting Pokratz, 771 F.2d at 209).
150. See, e.g., Cozzie v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.3d 1104, 1107-08 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding
that ifa decision "controverts the plain meaning of a plan" it is arbitrary and capricious).
151. See, e.g., Gallo v. Amoco Corp., 102 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that
"[s]ometimes ... sheer common sense ...

will provide the court with a handle for pronouncing the

administrator's determination arbitrary and capricious," but failing to find such); Hess v. Hartford
Life Ins. Co., 274 F.3d 456, 461 (7th Cir. 2001) ("In some cases, the plain language or structure of
the plan or simple common sense will require the court to pronounce an administrator's determination arbitrary and capricious." (citing Gallo, 102 F.3d at 922)); Dabertin v. HCR Manor Care, Inc.,
373 F.3d 822, 828 ("Where the committee's interpretation of the plan defies all common sense, the
district court must overturn that decision.").
152. See, e.g., Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 F.3d 375, 380 n.3 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that
"the arbitrary and capricious standard of review is a sliding scale standard that should be 'more penetrating the greater is the suspicion of partiality, less penetrating the smaller that suspicion is.,'
(quoting Van Boxel v. Journal Co. Employees' Pension Trust, 836 F.2d 1048, 1052 (7th Cir.
1987))); see also Chojnacki v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 108 F.3d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1997) ("While a conflict
of interest does not change the standard of review we apply to an administrator's decision, it will
cause us to give the arbitrary and capricious standard more bite. The more serious the conflict, the
less deferential our review becomes.") (citation omitted); Mers v. Marriott Int'l Group Accidental
Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 n.1(7th Cir. 1998) ("The arbitrary and capricious standard does not pose an all-or-nothing choice between full deference or none. Courts may
vary the deference incrementally to account for the strength or weakness of a specific conflict of
interest."); Hess v. Reg-Ellen Mach. Tool Corp., 423 F.3d 653, 660 (using a "slightly more penetrating review").
153. Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (comparing the claim of $240,000 with
total revenues of over $6 billion and finding that "[tihe impact on a company's welfare of granting
or denying benefits under a plan will not be sufficiently significant as to threaten the administrators'
partiality.") (citation omitted); Chojnacki, 108 F.3d at 815 (comparing the claim of $134,000 with
total revenues of over $12 billion and concluding that such a conflict was not serious enough to warrant consideration). But see Hess, 423 F.3d at 659-60 (finding a meaningful conflict where plan
fiduciary admitted that making the payout would have significantly affected plan resources).
154. See, e.g., Cozzie, 140 F.3d at 1108 ("Although MetLife acts as both administrator and
insurer of the plan, that factor, standing alone, does not constitute a conflict of interest."); Mers, 144
F.3d at 1020 (concluding that acting as plan fiduciary and paying claims out of pocket does not constitute a conflict of interest).
155. See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 272 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that claimant "has not presented any specific evidence of a conflict of interest and, therefore, we shall not consider that factor in our determination of the reasonableness of Hartford's decision.").
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I. Eighth Circuit
From 1994, the Eighth Circuit used an abuse of discretion standard
to review discretionary denials of ERISA benefits. 156 This was a departure from the prior post-Firestone use of arbitrary and capricious standard.1 57 Since the switch, however, later panels found the two standards
58
interchangeable, and used the same particular standards for both.1
When plan interpretation was at issue, a five-factor test regarding the
consistency of the interpretation was used. 159 Where the dispute was
more fact based in nature, the most frequently applied standard was
whether the administrator's decision was supported by substantial eviin the context of reasondence. 160 These standards were often presented
' 62
16
unreasonable."'
"extremely
or
1
ableness,
When there was a conflict of interest, less deferential (heightened
or sliding scale) review was to be applied, 163 but only when the benefi156. See, e.g., Cox v. Mid-Am. Dairymen, Inc. Ret. Plan, 965 F.2d 569, 571-72 & n.3 (8th Cir.
1992) ("Now that [Firestone]has liberated the ERISA standard from this LMRA analogy, the applicable deferential standard should be the abuse of discretion standard from the law of trusts."); Woo
v. Deluxe Corp., 144 F.3d 1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1998).
157. See, e.g., Oldenburger v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Teamsters Pension Fund, 934 F.2d
171, 173 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying arbitrary and capricious review).
158. See, e.g., Bounds v. Bell At. Enters. Flexible Long Term Disability Plan, 32 F.3d 337,
339 (8th Cir. 1994) (identifying either abuse of discretion or arbitrary and capricious as appropriate
for deferential review under Firestone); Donaho v. FMC Corp., 74 F.3d 894, 898 n.5 (8th Cir. 1996)
(noting that the choice between arbitrary and capricious and abuse of discretion may be a distinction
without a difference) (citations omitted); Hebert v. SBC Pension Benefit Plan, 354 F.3d 796, 798-99
(8th Cir. 2004) (noting that an abuse of discretion is when the administrator acted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner).
159. See, e.g., Finley v. Special Agents Mut. Benefits Ass'n., Inc., 957 F.2d 617, 621 (8th Cir.
1992) (using five consistency factors-whether a plan interpretation was consistent with plan goals,
past interpretations, the clear language of the plan, and the substantive and procedural requirements
of ERISA, and whether it renders other plan language meaningless or internally inconsistent-to
examine whether fiduciary's decision was arbitrary and capricious); Kennedy v. Ga. Pac. Corp., 31
F.3d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying abuse of discretion standard by examining Finley factors);
Buttram v. Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 76 F.3d 896, 899-901 (8th Cir.
1996) (applying abuse of discretion standard by examining Finley factors).
160. See, e.g., Wise v. Kind & Knox Gelatin, Inc., 429 F.3d 1188, 1190 (8th Cir. 2005) (applying abuse of discretion review as a test of reasonableness, where a reasonable decision is one supported by substantial evidence); see also Donaho, 74 F.3d at 900 (in applying the abuse of discretion standard, the decision would only be overturned if was made "without reason, unsupported by
substantial evidence, or erroneous as a matter of law" (citing Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.,
2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993))).
161. See, e.g., Finley, 957 F.2d at 621 (holding that decision will be upheld under arbitrary and
capricious review if reasonable); see also Cox, 13 F.3d at 274 (applying an abuse of discretion standard by examining the reasonableness of the ERISA plan administrator's decision).
162. See, e.g., Kennedy, 31 F.3d at 609 (applying abuse of discretion review by asking whether
the decision was extremely unreasonable).
163. See, e.g., Buttram, 76 F.3d at 900 (noting the possibility of heightened review where there
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ciary could provide material, probative evidence that (1) a serious procedural irregularity existed, and (2) this irregularity caused a serious
breach of the fiduciary's duty to the plan beneficiaries. 164 An insurer
paying benefits directly 65
out of pocket was not enough to trigger this
more deferential review.'
J. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit was unsteady in its post-Firestone review of
ERISA denial of benefits decisions. Prior to 1994, the circuit used either
abuse of discretion166 or arbitrary and capricious review,167 without
much distinction between the two. However, from 1994 through 2006,
the cases diverged between those which the circuit conflated the two
standards, 168 and those where the circuit simply applied abuse of discre-

is a conflict of interest, but not applying it); Armstrong v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 128 F.3d 1263, 1265
(8th Cir. 1997) (applying heightened review because of a conflict of interest); Farley v. Ark. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 147 F.3d 774, 776 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting the possibility of less deferential
review, but not applying it); Barnhart v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 179 F.3d 583, 589 (8th Cir.
1999) (noting sliding scale review, but not applying it); Sahulka v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 206 F.3d
763, 768 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting less deferential review, but not applying it); House v. Paul Revere
Life Ins. Co., 241 F.3d 1045, 1048 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting the possibility of a more searching review, but not bothering because the administrator's decision was an abuse of discretion).
164. See, e.g., Buttram, 76 F.3d at 899 (holding that "[flor this heightened review to apply, the
beneficiary must show (1)that a serious procedural irregularity existed, which (2) caused a serious
breach of the plan trustee's fiduciary duty to the plan beneficiary," and that this must be shown
through material, probative evidence); Layes v. Mead Corp., 132 F.3d 1246, 1250 (8th Cir. 1998)
(noting two-part gateway for less deferential review).
165. See, e.g., Farley, 147 F.3d at 776-77 (finding that an insurer acting as fiduciary has sufficient interest in granting claims to promote future business to weigh against its interests in denying
claims); see also Barnhart, 179 F.3d at 589 (giving full deference to insurer paying benefits out of
pocket); Schatz v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 220 F.3d 944, 947-49 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding a "palpable conflict of interest" but still not reducing deference); McGarrah v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 234
F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that "it is wrong to assume a financial conflict of interest
from the fact that a plan administrator is also the insurer," even when there is a serious procedural
irregularity, because the plaintiff still could not prove that the adverse decision was reached because
of the conflict). This circuit has reduced the deference all the way to de novo review where an insurer paid its claims adjusters a bonus for each claim denied. Armstrong, 128 F.3d at 1265.
166. See, e.g., Johnson v. Tr. of W. Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund, 879 F.2d
651, 654 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying abuse of discretion review).
167. See, e.g., Clark v. Wash. Teamsters Welfare Trust, 8 F.3d 1429, 1431-32 (9th Cir. 1993)
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard).
168. See, e.g., Barnett v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 32 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Under
an abuse of discretion standard, we will uphold the district court's decision unless Kaiser's conduct
was arbitrary and capricious." (citing Clark, 8 F.3d 1429, 1431 (9th Cir. 1993))); see also McKenzie
v. Gen. Tel. Co., 41 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1994) (using abuse of discretion and arbitrary and
capricious interchangeably); Atwood v. Newmont Gold Co. Inc., 45 F.3d 1317, 1321 n.] (9th Cir.
1995) ("Some of our cases state that an 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is applied, while others
use the term 'abuse of discretion.' The standards differ in name only .... We will therefore use the

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2009

23

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 5

128

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 27:105

tion.169 There was little divergence in the non-conflicted administrator
with each line appearing in varijurisprudence of the two lines of 1cases,
70
ous iterations with similar results.

Which line of decisions a case fell into was, however, very important if the case involved a conflicted plan fiduciary. In its early conflict
of interest jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit applied less deferential review to fiduciary decisions when the fiduciary was operating under a
conflict of interest.17' During this period the circuit held that even an
'abuse of discretion' terminology as well.") (citations omitted); Jordan v. Northrop Grumman Corp.
Welfare Benefit Plan, 370 F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2004) (using the abuse of discretion standard and
the arbitrary and capricious standard interchangeably).
169. See Lang v. Long-Term Disability Plan of Sponsor Applied Remote Tech., 125 F.3d 794,
797-98 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying abuse of discretion review, but reducing deference to de novo review because of a conflict of interest); Winters v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 49 F.3d 550, 552 (9th
Cir. 1995) (applying abuse of discretion review). See also Estate of Shockley v. Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co., 130 F.3d 403, 405 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying abuse of discretion review); Zavora v. Paul
Revere Life Ins. Co., 145 F.3d 1118, 1122 (9th Cir. 1998); Friedrich v. Intel Corp., 181 F.3d 1105,
1109-10 (applying abuse of discretion standard, but reducing to de novo review due to a conflict of
interest); Bendixen v. Standard Ins. Co., 185 F.3d 939, 942, 944 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying abuse of
discretion review); Tremain v. Bell Indus. Inc., 196 F.3d 970, 976 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying abuse
of discretion standard, but reducing deference to de novo review to account for conflict of interest);
McDaniel v. Chevron Corp., 203 F.3d 1099, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying abuse of discretion
review); Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan, 266 F.3d 1130, 1144-45 (9th
Cir. 2001) (applying abuse of discretion review); Nord v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d
823, 828 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying abuse of discretion standard, but reducing deference to de novo
review to account for conflict of interest); Alford v. DCH Found. Group Long-Term Disability Plan,
311 F.3d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (applying abuse of discretion review); Nord v. Black & Decker
Disability Plan, 356 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 2004); Boyd v. Bell, 410 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th
Cir. 2005); Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins. Co., 421 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005).
170. See Johnson, 879 F.2d at 654 (abuse of discretion occurs where the fiduciary makes decisions without providing an explanation, or "in a way that clearly conflicts with the plain language of
the plan"). See Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323-24 (finding an abuse of discretion where fiduciary makes a
decision without explanation, a decision that contradicts the clear language of the plan, or a decision
that relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact); Shockley, 130 F.3d at 405 (holding that a decision
should be upheld if based on a reasonable interpretation and made in good faith); see, e.g., Clark, 8
F.3d at 1432 (administrator's decision is arbitrary and capricious where unreasonable); see also
Hensley v. Nw. Permanente P.C. Ret. Plan & Trust, 258 F.3d 986, 1001-02 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a court may overturn a decision only where it is "so patently arbitrary and unreasonable as to
lack foundation in factual basis and/or authority in governing case or statute law." (quoting Oster v.
Barco of Cal. Employees' Ret. Plan, 869 F.2d 1215, 1219 (9th Cir. 1988))); Canseco v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 93 F.3d 600, 608 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that it is arbitrary and capricious
when a plan administrator makes decisions that conflict with the plain language of the plan or that
impose additional eligibility standards not contained within the plan); Schikore v. BankAmerica
Supplemental Ret. Plan, 269 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding arbitrary and capricious behavior where fiduciary makes a decision without explanation, a decision that contradicts the plain language of the plan, or a decision that relies on insufficiently developed facts).
171. Dytrt v. Mountain State Tel. & Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1990) (implementing
Firestone'sdirective to weigh conflicts of interest as a factor by applying a less deferential review);
Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993) (applying less deferential review for "serious" conflicts of interest); Nelson v. EG & G Energy Measurements Group, 37
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employer acting as a plan fiduciary could trigger less deferential review.172 In 1995, the circuit switched to a "burden-shifting" model, requiring the claimant to prove not only that there was a conflict, but that
the conflict in fact caused a breach of a fiduciary duty. 173 If the claimant
could not show this, then the court would ignore the conflict of interest. 174 Such proof, if not rebutted, placed the burden on the administrator to prove that the decision was not a result of the conflict.1 75 While
this standard was generally insurmountable in other circuits, 176 the Ninth
Circuit had been known to be reasonable in finding that claimants have
the standard-but only in the pure abuse of discretion line
actually met
177
cases.
of
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit started over with Abatie v. Alta Health &
Life Insurance Co. 178 In Abatie, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, held

that abuse of discretion was the proper standard, 179 that a plan administrator paying claims out of pocket is operating under a conflict of interest, t80 that the weight given to a conflict of interest will vary from case

F.3d 1384, 1388 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting less deferential review for conflicts).
172. Dytrt, 921 F.2d at 894 (noting that the circuit reduced deference for employers acting as
plan fiduciaries pre-Firestone,and so doing in the present case); Bogue v. Ampex Corp., 976 F.2d
1319, 1325 (9th Cir. 1992) (applying less deferential review when employer acted as administrator
of unfunded benefits plan, even though administrator was indemnified against the payments);
Watkins, 12 F.3d at 1524-25 (applying less deferential review when fiduciary committee is heavily
staffed with management-level employees of employer).
173. Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1322 ("We hold that this 'heightened standard' does not alter our traditional abuse of discretion review in the absence of specific facts indicating that [the fiduciary's]
conflicting interest caused a serious breach of the plan administrator's fiduciary duty to ... the plan
beneficiary."). This serious breach of fiduciary duty must be proven by material, probative evidence. Id. at 1323. See also Shockley, 130 F.3d at 405 (applying the burden-shifting approach to
conflicts of interest outlined in Atwood, but not finding a conflict); McDaniel v. Chevron Co., 203
F.3d 1099, 1107-09 (9th Cir. 2000); Alford, 311 F.3d at 957-59; Nord, 356 F.3d at 1010; Lang, 125
F.3d at 797-98 (applying the burden-shifting approach and finding a conflict sufficient to warrant de
novo review).
174. Atwood, 45 F.3d at 1323 ("If not, we apply our traditional abuse of discretion review.").
175. Id. ("Where the affected beneficiary has come forward with material evidence of a violation of the administrator's fiduciary obligation, we should not defer to the administrator's presumptively void decision. In that circumstance, the plan bears the burden of producing evidence to show
that the conflict of interest did not affect the decision to deny benefits.").
176. The Second and Eighth Circuits use similar language in their review of discretionary decisions of ERISA plan administrators, but seem to use a higher standard as a practical matter. See
supra text accompanying notes 107-18, 163-72.
177. See Lang, 125 F.3d at 798-99; Regula v. Delta Family-Care Disability Survivorship Plan,
266 F.3d 1130, 1144-47 (9th Cir. 2001); Nord v. v. Black & Decker Disability Plan, 296 F.3d 823,
828-32 (9th Cir. 2002).
178. 458 F.3d 955, 966-67 (9th Cir. 2006) (overruling all aspects of Atwood's holdings on conflicts of interest).
179. Id. at 965.
180. Id. at 965-67.
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to case tailored to the particular circumstances presented," 81 and that
plaintiffs were not required to82present "smoking gun" evidence that the
conflict affected the decision.
K. Tenth Circuit
83

The Tenth Circuit applies an arbitrary and capricious standard.
The circuit found arbitrary and capricious conduct where the ERISA fiduciary's decision is not supported by185substantial evidence or erroneous
18 4
as a matter of law, or unreasonable.
The Tenth Circuit in the past has applied a sliding scale reducing
deference for conflicts of interest. 186 This has resulted in insurers who
were acting as plan administrators being found to operate under a conflict of interest.'87 Recently, the circuit has paid closer attention to such

181. Id. at 967-69,
182. Id. at 969.
183. See, e.g., Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Mgmt., Inc. Employee Sav. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651,
657-58 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying arbitrary and capricious review).
184. Id. at 657 ("In reviewing fiduciary benefit decisions, we have repeatedly held that such
decisions are to be upheld unless '(1) arbitrary and capricious, (2) not supported by substantial evidence, or (3) erroneous on a question of law."' (quoting Sage v. Automation Inc. Pension Plan &
Trust, 845 F.2d 885, 895 (10th Cir. 1998))); Finley v. Hewlett-Packard Co. Employee Benefits Org.
Income Prot. Plan, 379 F.3d 1168, 1172-76 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding decisions arbitrary and capricious where unsupported by substantial evidence, erroneous as a matter of law, made in bad faith, or
as the result of a conflict of interest).
185. See, e.g., Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999)
("[A] court may not overturn a plan administrator's decision if it was reasonable, given the terms of
); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1098 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The reviewing
the plan ....
court 'need only assure that the administrator's decision fall[s] somewhere on a continuum of reasonableness - even if on the low end."' (quoting Vega v. Nat'l Life Ins. Serv., Inc., 188 F.3d 287,
297 (5th Cir. 1999))); Rademacher v. Colorado Ass'n of Soil Conservation Dists. Med. Benefit
Plan, II F.3d 1567, 1569 (10th Cir. 1993) ("An interpretation will be upheld under this standard if it
is reasonable and made in good faith."); McGraw v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 137 F.3d 1253,
1259 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding a decision if it is based on a reasonable interpretation); see also
Fought v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 379 F.3d 997, 1003 (10th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he plan administrator's interpretation of ambiguous plan provision should be judged as follows: (a) as a result of
reasoned and principled process (b) consistent with any prior interpretations by the plan administrator (c) reasonable in light of any external standards and (d) consistent with the purposes of the
plan." (quoting Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1135, 1172)).
186. Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Okla., 24 F.3d 118, 122-24 (10th Cir. 1994) (recommending that, on remand, the district court apply reduced deference as a result of plan fiduciary's conflict of interest); Chambers v. Family Health Plan Corp., 100 F.3d 818, 826-27 (10th Cir.
1996) (applying sliding scale review to compensate for a conflict of interest); Kimber, 196 F.3d at
1097-98 (noting sliding scale review, but not applying it); Pitman v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 217
F.3d 1291, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying reduced deference to compensate for conflict of interest).
187. See, e.g., Pitman, 24 F.3d at 122-23 (a court must pay attention to the conflict of interest
inherent in a plan when a fiduciary insures a plan and pays benefits out of pocket).
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inherent conflicts of interest. In these situations, the circuit has merged
its sliding scale with a two-tier approach which includes burdenshifting. 88 Under the merged sliding scale/burden shifting approach, the
sliding scale applies except when there is an inherent conflict of interest,
a proven conflict of interest, or a serious procedural irregularity, the burden shifts to the plan fiduciary to prove that its interpretation of the plan
was reasonable
and that its findings of fact were supported by substantial
89
evidence.
L. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit applies an arbitrary and capricious standard in
reviewing ERISA discretionary denial of benefits claims, 90 though it
does not consider the distinction between this and abuse of discretion
material.' 91 The circuit has generally applied this as a reasonableness
standard. 92 In applying this reasonableness standard, the circuit first
asks whether the administrator's decision was wrong, and then applies
the appropriate review if it was. 193 This review is broken down into six
steps: (1) determine whether decision was wrong and affirm if not; (2)
determine whether the administrator had discretion and reverse if not;
(3) determine whether reasonable grounds supported the decision; (4) if
there are no reasonable grounds, reverse the decision; if not then determine whether there is a conflict of interest; (5) if there is no conflict, af-

188. Fought, 379 F.3dat 1006.
189. Flinders v. Workforce Stabilization Plan of Phillips Petroleum Co., 491 F.3d 1180, 118990 (10th Cir. 2007) (this approach has since been altered under Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn,
128 S. Ct. 2343).
190. See, e.g., Guy v. Se. Iron Workers' Welfare Fund, 877 F.2d 37, 38-39 (11th Cir. 1989)
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard); see also Florence Nightingale Nursing Serv. v. Blue
Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 41 F.3d 1476, 1481-82 (1 1th Cir. 1995) (applying arbitrary and capricious review). Despite the court's assertion that it is not, the court ends up at no deference only
after applying arbitrary and capricious modified for conflict of interest and finding a failure on the
part of the insurer to dispel the conflict.
191. See, e.g., Hunt v. Hawthorne Assocs. Inc., 119 F.3d 888, 912 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting
interchangeability of the arbitrary and capricious standard and the abuse of discretion standard).
192. See, e.g., Levinson v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 245 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (1 1th Cir.
2001) (finding decisions not to be arbitrary and capricious if reasonable); see also Guy, 877 F.3d at
39 ("Factors taken into account include '(1) uniformity of construction; (2) 'fair reading' and reasonableness of that reading; and (3) unanticipated costs."' (quoting Griffis v. Delta Family-Care
Disability, 723 F.2d 822, 825 (11 th Cir. 1984))).
193. See, e.g., Brown v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 898 F.2d 1556, 1566-67 (11th Cir.
1990) ("[O]ur first step in the application of arbitrary and capricious standard is determining the
legally correct interpretation of the disputed plan provision."); see also Williams v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 373 F.3d 1132, 1138 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that the correct legal interpretation must
first be determined).
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firm; and (6) if there is a conflict, apply heightened arbitrary and capricious review.194
In the Eleventh Circuit, when reviewing the decision of a conflicted
fiduciary, the court has held that the contours of the arbitrary and capricious review should be "shaped by the circumstances of the inherent
conflict of interest."'1 95 If a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial
conflict of interest on the part of the fiduciary, the burden then shifts to
the fiduciary to prove that its decision was not tainted by the conflict of
interest.196 The circuit finds a strong, inherent conflict of interest when a
plan administrator (either an insurer or an employer) pays benefits out of
pocket, an insurance company employee doctor makes decisions of medical necessity, or an insurance company employee serves on the review
board.1 97
V. METLIFE

A. The Holding in Glenn
After 19 years of uneven circuit court application of Firestone,the
194. Williams, 373 F.3d at 1138 (identifying these six steps).
195. Brown, 898 F.2d at 1563-64. ("The degree of deference exercised in review of a fiduciary's decision ranges from slight to great, depending upon the dynamics of the decisionmaking
process. In Posnerian terms, 'the arbitrary and capricious standard may be a range, not a point."'
Id.) (citations omitted).
196. Id. at 1566 ("[W]hen a plan beneficiary demonstrates a substantial conflict of interest on
the part of the fiduciary responsible for benefits determinations, the burden shifts to the fiduciary to
prove that its interpretation of plan provisions committed to its discretion was not tainted by selfinterest."); see also Newell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 904 F.2d 644, 651-52 (11 th Cir. 1990)
(applying the Brown two-step burden shifting test); Lee v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., 10
F.3d 1547, 1552 (11 th Cir. 1994) (noting Brown two-step, but remanding to the district court to determine whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious under that standard); Florence Nightingale, 41 F.3d at 1481-82 (noting arbitrary and capricious review, then shifting the burden to the defendant to rebut an inherent conflict). The court went on to apply de novo review after the
defendant failed to rebut, thus performing all the functions of Brown arbitrary and capricious burden-shifting, despite asserting that it is not applying arbitrary and capricious review. See also
Adams v. Thiokol Corp., 231 F.3d 837, 842 (1 1th Cir. 2000) (shifting the burden of proving proper
decisionmaking to the fiduciary).
197. See, e.g., Brown, 898 F.2d at 1561-62 ("Because an insurance company pays out to beneficiaries from its own assets rather than the assets of a trust, its fiduciary role lies in perpetual conflict with its profit-making role as a business. [A] 'strong conflict of interest [exists] when the fiduciary making a discretionary decision is also the insurance company responsible for paying the
claims ....' (quoting Jader v. Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp 1338, 1343 (D. Minn
1989))); see also Newell, 904 F.2d at 650 (finding a conflict of interest when insurance company
employees determine medical necessity); HCA Health Servs. of Ga., Inc., v. Employers Health Ins.
Co., 240 F.3d 982, 1001 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (finding conflict of interest when insurance company pays
benefits out of pocket); Adams, 231 F.3d at 842-43 (finding a conflict of interest in an employer's
potential losses due to claims payments to justify heightening scrutiny).
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Supreme Court revisited the issue of conflicted ERISA fiduciaries.1 99 In
MetLife, the Supreme Court first held that an ERISA plan administrator
who both evaluates claims for benefits and pays benefits out of pocket is
operating under a conflict of interest, 20 0 regardless of whether that administrator is an employer or an insurer.201
The Court then turned to the question of how such a conflict was to
be considered, and reiterated and expanded upon its statement in Firestone that the conflict should be weighed as a factor in determining
whether there was an abuse of discretion.20 2 The Court rejected using
the existence of a conflict of interest to reduce the abuse of discretion
review to de novo review,20 3 and also rejected the use of "special burdenof-proof rules, or special procedural or evidentiary rules, focused narrowly upon the evaluator/payor conflict., 20 4 The Court stated that "Firestone means what the word 'factor' implies.., and that judges will take
into account a conflict of interest as one of many considerations. 20 5 In
examining the facts of MetLife, the Court noted that it was not creating a
talismanic list of details that lower courts were required to examine.20 6
207
the Court relied on principles of trust
MetLife, its
as holdings.
in Firestone,
20 8
law inInreaching
B. The Impact of Glenn In The Circuits
MetLife has already induced a number of changes in circuit court
case law. The circuits have almost universally moved in the direction of
comporting with MetLife, although they have not universally had the opportunity to address each aspect of the case.
The reiteration in MetLife that structural conflicts of interest are the
sort of conflicts of interest that must be considered prompted the First,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits to reject their prior holdings to the con20
trary.20 9 Further, circuits have rejected burden-shifting methodology
199. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348-52 (2008).
200. Id. at 2348-50 ("The first question [before us] asks whether the fact that a plan administrator both evaluates claims for benefits and pay benefits claims creates the kind of 'conflict of interest' to which Firestone'sfourth principle refers. In our view, it does.").
201. Id. at 2348-49.
202. Id. at 2350-52.
203. Id. at 2350-51.
204. Id. at2351.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 2352.
207. See supraPart III.A
208. MetLife, 128 S. Ct. at 2348-51 (repeatedly citing the Restatement and other trust law materials).
209. The First and Fifth Circuit's explicitly overruled their prior holdings. See Denmark v.
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and old holdings that a claimant had to prove that a conflict actually affected the decision before that conflict could be considered. 211 The Eleventh Circuit also rejected its "heightened arbitrary and capricious"
standard.21 2 Most of the circuits which formerly applied a "sliding
23
scale" approach have now rejected that as inconsistent with MetLife. 1
The Tenth Circuit, however, harmonized the "sliding scale" aspects of
its review with MetLife. 214
The one instance of continued non-conformity with Supreme Court
precedent so far has come in the Second Circuit. The first Second Circuit panel to address MetLife held that MetLife abrogated that circuit's
rule that a conflict of interest could be disregarded unless the claimant
proves that the conflict actually affected the decision.2 15 However, a later panel saddled complainants with the worst of both worlds, applied the
old requirement that a claimant was required to make this showing of actual affect, while at the same time holding that MetLife abrogated2t 6the
circuit's old rule that such a showing reduced the review to de novo.
VI.

THE PROPER STANDARD

A proper standard for judicial review of the decisions of ERISA
plan fiduciary's in discretionary denial of benefits cases must follow the
Supreme Court's decisions in Firestone and Glenn and comport with
Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 566 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2009); Crowell v. Shell Oil Co., 541
F.3d 295, 312 (5th Cir. 2008). The Seventh Circuit did not reference its prior holdings that were
contrary to MetLife, but has ceased applying them. See, e.g., Marrs v. Motorola, Inc., 577 F.3d 783,
786-89 (7th Cir. 2009); Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 861
(7th Cir. 2009).
210. These rejections included burden shifting standards that shifted the burden when the effect
of a conflict on the decision was proven. See Hackett v. Standard Ins. Co., 559 F.3d 825, 830 (8th
Cir. 2009). And burden shifting standards that shifted merely because a conflict existed. See Doyle
v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Boston, 542 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2008).
211. See, e.g., Chronisterv. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 563 F.3d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 2009).
212. See Doyle, 542 F.3dat 1358-59.
213. See, e.g., Estate of Schwing v. Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 525 (3d Cir. 2009);
Champion v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 358-59 (4th Cir. 2008).
214. The Tenth Circuit held that the sliding scale approach-giving less deference based on the
degree of conflict-mirrored MetLife's holding that the conflict of interest factor would weigh more
or less heavily depending on its magnitude. See Weber v. GE Group Life Assurance Co., 541 F.3d
1002, 1010-11 (10th Cir. 2008). However, the Tenth Circuit did not address the burden-shifting
aspect of its review of conflicted administrator's decisions. See Weber, 541 F.3d 1002.
215. See McCauley v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., 551 F.3d 126, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).
216. See Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 83 (2d Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit may
also be headed in this direction. See Dutka ex rel. Estate of T.M. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 573 F.3d
210, 213 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009) ("Appellants adduced no evidence in this case that AIG's conflict affected the benefits decision and in light of the evidence supporting the plan administrator's decision,
the conflict of interest is not a 'tiebreaking' factor.").
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ERISA's goals of providing uniformity and protecting plan participants.
In the wake of MetLife, the circuits have begun moving in the right direction, replacing the prior jumble of standards that did not meet these
criteria. Now is time for the circuit courts to adopt a proper, universal
2 18
standard of review,217 to be applied to ERISA denial of benefits cases.
A. Abuse of DiscretionReview Rather Than Arbitraryand Capricious

Review
To determine the proper standard, the starting point must be the Supreme Court's decisions in Firestone and Glenn. Under the holding of
those cases, the standard should be abuse of discretion. Whether the
standard is called "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" is
irrelevant, if the result is the same in the end. However, it is important
that the abuse of discretion standard be used for two reasons. 21 9 First, if
there is no effect on the substance of the test based on the language used,
then the test should use language consistent with Firestone. Second, the
use of the term "arbitrary and capricious" has not produced correct results. Arbitrary and capricious is as deferential a test as one could devise, and most of the circuit courts have been applying it as such. There
must be a clean break between the flawed jurisprudence of the past and a
better jurisprudence of the future. Using the correct terminology will
further this goal.
217. It has been argued that taking the procedural posture of these cases to be a review of an
administrative decision, rather than a suit under contract, is improper. See Conison, supra note 33,
at 58, 60. This argument is buttressed by the contrast between the Social Security Act, which provides for a civil action to obtain review of a decision, and ERISA's language providing for a civil
action that is a suit for benefits. O'Neil, supra note 33, at 751 (comparing the language of the Social Security Act and ERISA private rights of action, as codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 29
U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B)). This option is, however, not consistent with Firestone and MetLife, and
will not be considered. See generally Roy F. Harmon III, The Debate Over Deference In The
ERISA Setting - Judicial Review of Decisions By Conflicted Fiduciaries,54 S.D.L. REV. 1, 2-6, 1820 (2009) (asserting that review of ERISA benefit determinations has been becoming more similar
to review of agency administrative decisions).
218. New, universal standards for review of these cases have been suggested before. See Kennedy, supra note 4, at 1168-73 (proposing arbitrary and capricious review using a four-factored reasonableness standard burden-shifting test to compensate for conflicts of interest); Bradley R. Duncan, JudicialReview of FiduciaryClaim Denials Under ERISA: An Alternative to the Arbitrary and
CapriciousTest, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 986, 1008 (1986) (arguing that the arbitrary and capricious
standard should be replaced with a "solely in the interest of the plan participants" test, which would
require that a denial be based an unambiguous provision with either a demonstrated actuarial need
for such provision or the administrator showing that the claimant's proposed reading of the provision would constitute a threat to the plan's health).
219. But see Jenkins v. Price Waterhouse Long Term Disability Plan, 564 F.3d 856, 861 n.8
(7th Cir. 2009) ("Nit-pickers might argue that there is a distinction between the arbitrary and capricious standard of review and testing for an abuse of discretion.").
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Not only does the arbitrary and capricious test carry the weight of
its past, but the words themselves carry the wrong connotations for the
task at hand. By plain meaning, something is arbitrary and capricious if
it is unpredictable, determined by chance, whim or impulse and not by
necessity, reason, or principle. 220 An abuse of discretion simply means
to misuse the power to act on one's own.221 Even if as terms of art these
two phrases had the same connotation, they carry a meaning from their
English usage. Certainly, ERISA fiduciary decisions that are arbitrary
and capricious are an abuse of discretion, but most ERISA denial of
benefits claims do not assert that the denial was based on whim, chance
or impulse. Rather, they assert that the decision was based on a desire
on the part of the fiduciary to increase profits. There is no assertion that
these decisions are not motivated by a reasoned principle, the issue is
whether or not the reasoned principle involved was the benefit of the
plan participants or the bottom line of the company making the decision.
In ERISA denial of benefits cases, arbitrary and capricious does not
properly address the issues at hand. As directed by Firestoneand Glenn,
the circuit courts should use abuse of discretion language instead of arbitrary and capricious.
B. Nonexclusive Factors That Courts May Consider
In MetLife, the Supreme Court disavowed the use of a talismanic
list of details that courts were required to consider in every case.2 22 Such
a standard gives judges the greatest leeway to examine all the information available in whatever fashion is most efficient for the case at hand.
Unfortunately, vague standards in the past have led to excessive deference to the decisions of ERISA fiduciaries. Furthermore, the use of
completely freeform determinations could undermine one of the primary
goals of ERISA, the creation of uniformity in the field of employee benefits. However, the flexible approach of MetLife is consistent with the
use of a list of nonexclusive factors that lower courts may-but are not
required to-consider.22 3 By identifying an array of nonexclusive factors, the circuit courts can provide district courts with a universal
framework to reference when making their decisions and litigants will be
220. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 91 (4th ed. 2000).
221. Id. at 8.
222. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S, Ct. 2343, 2352 (2008).
223. See Champion v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 550 F.3d 353, 359 (4th Cir. 2008) (reiterating post-MetLife eight nonexclusive factors that a court may consider in assessing whether there
was an abuse of discretion (citing Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Ass'n Health & Welfare Plan, 201

F.3d 335 (4th Cir. 2000))).
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better able to gauge in advance what the case will turn on and what the
outcome should be. This blended approach allows for flexibility and
judicial discretion, is helpful to district courts, and furthers the uniformity goal of ERISA. For these reasons, the standard of review adopted to
review ERISA denial of benefits cases should contain substantial guidance for district courts.
C. PreliminaryMatters
Before applying the heart of the abuse of discretion standard, there
are two issues the court should examine, as they can be determinative of
the outcome regardless of other factors.
The first issue deals with whether the administrator's decision was
correct. The correct interpretation of any disputed plan provisions can
be settled under standard contract interpretation procedures, and the
court can make any necessary findings of fact. The purpose of engaging
in a determination of the correct plan interpretation and/or finding of fact
is to compare this to the actual interpretation or finding of fact made by
the administrator. If the administrator's decision was correct, then the
court may simply end its inquiry. While the court still has to deal with
substantive elements of the claim, it can avoid entering the procedural
aspects of abuse of discretion review. This promotes efficiency since the
correctness review requires examination of the same materials as the full
abuse of discretion review. 24
The second matter is whether the ERISA administrator's decision
hinges on a pure question of law. While ERISA plan administrators may
have discretion to interpret their own plan documents, it is the province
of the courts to decide what the law is. Where the review concerns a
pure question of law, the review must be de novo regardless of plan provisions granting discretion.22 5
224.

This article does not seek to address what circumstances should allow the court to consid-

er evidence presented by the parties in court that was never presented to the plan administrator during the original claims process. See generally O'Neil, supra note 33, at 754-61 (discussing the
problems with allowing the court's review to be controlled by the fiduciary's construction of the

administrative record).
225.

This application is well-established. See, e.g., Gauer v. Connors, 953 F.2d 97, at 99-100

(4th Cir. 1991) (reviewing plan administrator's interpretation of ERISA law de novo); Weil v. Ret.
Plan Admin. Comm. of Terson Co., Inc., 913 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying de novo

review to an administrator's interpretation of the meaning of "partial termination" in the federal tax
codes); Penn v. Howe-Baker Eng'rs, Inc., 898 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying de novo

review to a plan administrator's interpretation of whether claimant was an employee or an independent contractor at common law); Izzarelli v. Rexene Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1514 (5th Cir. 1994);

Matassarin v. Lynch, 174 F.3d 549, 563 (5th Cir. 1999) (reviewing legal conclusions regarding the
meaning of a contract or statute de novo); Williams v. Midwest Operating Eng'rs Welfare Fund, 125
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Before plunging into the heart of its abuse of discretion review, the
court should first determine whether the plan administrator's decision
was correct. If the decision was correct, then it should be upheld, and
the court need not proceed further. Otherwise, the court must determine
if the administrator's decision was erroneous as a matter of law. If it
was, then the court should simply apply de novo review. The administrator's decision will then be overturned, as the court has already determined that the decision was incorrect.
D. Conflicts of Interest
The core of abuse of discretion review hinges on a balancing act between a variety of factors. One of these factors is the existence of a conis mandated
flict of interest. This factor is present in the Restatement, 226-mnae
by Firestone227 and MetLife228 and a proper abuse of discretion review
cannot be performed without considering it. The decision is whether or
not the conflict of interest factor should be singled out from the others,
and if so, how. Before MetLife, most of the circuit courts had chosen to
single this factor out, either in an all-or-nothing burden-shifting,229 or by
using a sliding scale test. 230 Since the Supreme Court's statement in
MetLife against the creation of "special burden-of-proof rules, ' 231 however, many circuits have joined the Sixth 23 2 and Ninth 233 Circuits in declining the single out the conflict of interest factor for special treatment. 4 In light of MetLife, and in the interest of uniformity, no special
alteration of the deference given to a plan administrator's decision
should be applied to conflicts of interest.
Even considering MetLife, sliding scale review for conflicted fiduciaries is arguably an appropriate way of weighing the conflict as a factor because the sliding scale method is still a balancing test. Separately
labeling this particular factor would serve to emphasize its importance,
F.3d 1138, 1140 (7th Cir. 1997) (reviewing an error of law de novo).
226.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).

227. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989); Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 384 n.15 (2002) ("In Firestone Tire itself, we noted that review
for abuse of discretion would hone in on any conflict of interest on the plan fiduciary's part, if a
conflict was plausibly raised.").
228. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 128 S.Ct. 2343, 2348-52 (2008).
229. See supra notes 111-16, 182-89, 293-96 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 103-05, 119-25, 134-35, 141, 158-61, 169-71, 202-05 and accompanying
text.
231. MetLife, 128 S. Ct. at 2351.
232. See supra notes 149-150 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 189 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 236, 239 and accompanying text.
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as appropriate in light of the Supreme Court's special mention of it in
Firestone and Glenn,235 and given the lower courts' history of neglecting
it.23 6 A sliding scale standard protects plan participants by making sure
that conflicted fiduciaries are always called to count, and in a way that is
still fair to those fiduciaries.
However, the "sliding scale" method is, ultimately, a special burden-of-proof rule. Considering conflicts of interest as one factor among
many-albeit often a very important one-produces nearly the same
practical results as the "sliding scale" method, while strictly adhering to
Glenn. Further, the strong shift away from the "sliding scale" after
Glenn 23 7 means that the goal of uniformity is more easily within reach
for a standard that does not single out conflicts of interest.
The burden-shifting alternative should be rejected for two reasons.
First, it tends to inappropriately dismiss conflicts of interest altogether
when the claimant cannot prove that the conflict actually affected the
decision. This is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's requirement that
such a conflict be "weighed as a factor" in judging an abuse of discretion. It is clearly a problematic special burden-of-proof rule, and it does
not comport with ERISA's goal of protecting plan participants and beneficiaries because it lays an almost insurmountable burden on claimants.
The second problem with burden-shifting approach is that when the
claimant does meet this burden, the technique inappropriately presumes
that the claimant is correct and places the burden of proof on the fiduciary to show otherwise. This is not supported in the statutes, it is not
supported in Firestone or Glenn, and it is not supported in the Restatement (Second) of Trusts.238 The most stringent review under ERISA is
de novo, with no deference to either party. To go further is inappropriate.
In addition, meaningful implementation of this factor requires
courts to properly recognize when there is a conflict of interest. In particular, as the Supreme Court recognized in MetLife, when the plan fiduciary is paying benefits claims directly out of company coffers, there
should be no doubt that it creates a conflict. 239 The fiduciary is in the
235. Firestone, 489 U.S. at 115 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d
(1959)); MetLife, 128 S.Ct. at 2348-50.
236. See generallysupra Part IV.
237. Compare supra note 239 and accompanying text, with supra note 240 and accompanying
text.
238. Even in cases where the plan participant is able to prove that the fiduciary's decision was
made in bad faith, the result is simply for the court to substitute its own judgment, not for the court
to defer to the wishes of the beneficiary. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmts. f-g
(1959).
239. SeeMetLife, 128 S.Ct. at2348.
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business of making money. Every claim denied not only profits the fiduciary immediately, but sets precedent for denials of similar claims in
the future. While there may be other countervailing factors, such as the
long-term ability to attract good employees, this does not make the central conflict disappear. 240 Further, claimants should not be required to
prove an actual effect on the decision in question before a conflict may
be considered. This sort of extra burden-of-proof fails to weigh the conflict of interest as a factor, and is contrary to Firestone, MetLife,241 and
the principles of the Restatement.
Prior to MetLife, circuit courts had shied away from these positions,
because so many ERISA fiduciaries have placed themselves in this sort
of serious conflict, and courts perhaps wished to avoid seriously reviewing every single ERISA claim where benefits were denied. This approach ignores the elephant in the room-the ubiquitous nature of these
conflicts of interest cries out for increased, rather than reduced, judicial
involvement. Congress did not pass legislation to protect employee benefit plan participants because it was a small problem. Thus, the legislature's will should not be thwarted because the problems that the legislaThe response to fiduciaries'
tion addresses are so widespread.
willingness to place their own interests at odds with the interest of the
beneficiaries is to "clamp down" on those plan administrators.
Conflicts of interest are avoidable. Companies can use funded
trusts so that payments of claims do not translate directly into corporate
losses. Fiduciaries can use truly independent claims handlers, or at the
very least independent claims denial review boards, rather than their
own interested employees. For medical benefits determinations, ERISA
fiduciaries can seek out independent medical review, rather than relying
on company employees or a small stable of hand-picked doctors whose
continued employment depends on their producing results favorable to
the fiduciary. A claims process whereby a doctor, who is employed by
the insurance company, provides a recommendation to an adjuster, who
is similarly employed by the insurance company, that is reviewed by
others, who are also employed by the insurance company, does not dissipate a conflict of interest. ERISA fiduciaries have the choice to mi-

240. See John H. Langbein, Trust Law as Regulatory Law: The Unum/Provident Scandal and
JudicialReview of Benefit Denials Under ERISA, 101 Nw. U.L. REv. 1315, 1327-33 (2007) (laying
out the numerous flaws in the arguments minimizing the conflict of interest that arises for ERISA
plan administrator's who make claims determinations and pay benefits out of pockets).
241. Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts, although concurring in the judgment in MetLife, wrote separately because he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that a claimant need not show in advance that the conflict affected the decision. MetLife, 128 S.Ct. at 2352-55 (Roberts, J., concurring).
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nimize their conflicts of interest,
and the courts should not simply excuse
242
those who choose not to do so.
Conflicts of interest should be considered as one factor among
many, with no special procedural consideration, although the importance
of this factor should not be understated. In applying this standard, courts
must not ignore the serious conflicts that arise when an ERISA fiduciary,
especially a third-party insurance company, pays all claims out of company coffers. Likewise, they must not impose a special burden-of-proof
rule requiring claimants to prove the effect of a conflict of interest before
the court will weight it as a factor.
E. OtherFactorsAvailablefor Consideration
2 43 Comment "d" to Section
As identified by the Court in Firestone,
187 of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts is the appropriate place to ex2 44
amine for additional factors to be used in abuse of discretion review.
Comment "d" identifies five factors, other than a conflict of interest,
which are to be considered in this analysis. 245 Each of these factors
should be examined for its applicability in the ERISA denial of benefits
context.
The first factor put forth by the Restatement is the extent of the fiduciary's discretion.24 6 This factor is moot for ERISA abuse of discretion review because by the time the court is applying the test, it has already determined that the action taken by the fiduciary falls within its
discretion in administering the ERISA plan. If it were outside the fiduciary's discretion, then the court would simply be applying de novo review.247
The second Restatement factor is the purpose of the trust. 248 All
ERISA plans have the general purpose of providing for the plan partici-

242. See MetLife, 128 S.Ct. at 2350 ("ERISA imposes higher-than-marketplace quality standards on insurers. it sets forth a special standard of care upon a plan administrator, namely, that the
administrator 'discharge [its] duties' in respect to discretionary claims processing 'solely in the interests of the participants and beneficiaries' of the plan." (quoting ERISA § 404, 29 U.S.C. §
I104(a)(1) (2006))).
243. See Firestone, 489 U.S. at I II (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d
(1959)); see also MetLife, 128 S.Ct. at 2348-51.
244.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).

245. Id. These factors are (1) the extent of the fiduciary's discretion, (2) the purposes of the
trust, (3) the nature of the power, (4) any external standards against which the fiduciary's conduct
can be judged, and (5) why the fiduciary did or did not exercise the power in the fashion that he did.
Id.
246. Id.
247. Firestone,489 U.S. at 111-13.
248.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
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pants and beneficiaries; on these general grounds alone this factor is not
helpful. Some ERISA plans, however, intend to provide for the plan
participants in certain ways. In those situations, it is possible for this
purpose to affect whether or not an administrator has abused its discretion. The plan administrator could be justified in taking into account a
dichotomy between the purpose of a plan provision and the actual circumstances when determining whether or not to pay out benefits. Since
the general application of this factor from the Restatement is taken into
account, by conflict of interest dimensions of deferential review already
discussed, 249 a meaningful way to apply it is to determine if the administrator's decision was consistent with any particular purpose of a plan
provision.
The third factor presented by the Restatement is the nature of the
power being exercised by the administrator. ° Since this abuse of discretion test is concerned only with denials of benefits under ERISA
plans, the power will in all instances be the same-the power to grant or
deny participants claims for benefits, thus, this factor is not helpful here.
The fourth factor for abuse of discretion review under the Restatement is the presence and character of any external standard against
which the administrator's decision may be judged. 251 There are three
sources against which the conduct of an ERISA fiduciary can be judged:
(1) factual evidence such as medical information, (2) the provisions of
the employee benefits plan from which the fiduciary derives its power,
and (3) the federal statutes and regulations governing the administration
of ERISA plans.
An ERISA administrator's findings of fact can be judged against a
number of criteria. Any finding of fact should meet the general standard
of being supported by substantial evidence.2 52 In addition, however, the
plan administrator should have properly considered all relevant information in making the decision. In particular, evidence that must be considered by ERISA plan fiduciaries often includes medical reports. A plan
fiduciary denying benefits should ensure that sufficient medical information has been considered and personnel who are equipped to do so have
considered it. If a doctor does not make the final decision, then it should
at least include some review by medical staff and an explanation to enable the non-specialist to make an appropriate final decision. Independent medical review should also be included to support a medical deter-

249.

See supra Part V.D.

250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
251. Id.
252. See supra notes 101, 107, 109-10, 117, 129, 166, 191, 196 and accompanying text.
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mination. The review should be full meaning that the review should at
least consist of a doctor examining the entire medical file,25 3 rather than
reviewing a narrow portion prepared by the fiduciary. The record of this
review should demonstrate that the doctor considered all significant issues raised by the plan participant during the claims procedure. Findings
of fact outside the medical realm should also include all significant issues. Therefore, the factors available for consideration to a court applying an abuse of discretion test should include: (1) whether the administrator's decision was supported by substantial evidence, (2) whether all
significant issues were considered in the decisionmaking process, and
(3) for medical benefits whether the decision was made after a full independent medical review, and the individual making the final decision
made it on the basis of fully-understood information.
Review of an ERISA administrator's decision involving a plan interpretation should include some comparison to the actual plan language.
Review of a denial of benefits should generally examine (1) whether the
interpretation is consistent with the clear language of the plan, and (2)
whether the interpretation would render parts of the plan inconsistent or
meaningless.
The third external standard against which an administrator's decision can be compared is the body of law governing ERISA plans. These
consist of both general statutory commands,254 and the precise regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor. 255 In particular, breaches
of the Code of Federal Regulations provisions regarding claims procedures could weigh against a plan administrator in a determination of
whether that administrator's decision was an abuse of discretion.2 56
Given the extensive nature of federal regulation in this area, it would be
difficult to identify them all, and it suffices to note that a reviewing court
should consider examining whether the fiduciary's decisionmaking pro253. The treating physician rule does not apply in ERISA denial of benefits cases, so the courts
may not place any heightened burden of explanation on plan administrators for rejecting the opinion
of a treating physician in favor of the opinion of a non-treating physician. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 825, 831 (2003) ("Nothing in [ERISA] itself, however, suggests that
plan administrators must accord special deference to the opinions of treating physicians. Nor does
[ERISA] impose a heightened burden of explanation on administrators when they reject a treating
physician's opinion.").
254. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2006).
255. 29 C.F.R. §§ 2509.75-2 - 2590 (2005).
256. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1 (2005). The requirements include providing plan beneficiaries
with a written description of the claims procedure, id. at (b)(2); not charging additional fees for appeals of benefits denials, id. at (b)(3); providing prompt notification of adverse benefits determinations including the specific reason or reasons for the determination, id. at (g)(l)(i); and a crafting an
appeal process that provides full and fair review with significant procedural protections to plan participants and their beneficiaries, id. at (h)-(j).
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cedure comports with the substantive and procedural requirements embodied in ERISA regulations.
The fifth and final factor presented in the Restatement are the rea217
sons why the trustee chose to exercise the power to deny benefits.
While this Restatement factor does include considerations of completely
improper motivation, these concerns have been sufficiently dealt with by
the attention focused on conflicts of interest.25 8 However, this Restatement factor also encapsulates concerns regarding the reasoning process
that went into the decision. This includes whether the decision was
reached by chance, whim, or impulse rather than reason or principle.259
These concerns also include ensuring consistent application of the plan
from one participant to another. Therefore, abuse of discretion review
should weigh as factors (1) whether the decision was the result of a reasoned or principled decisionmaking process, 260 and (2) whether any interpretations of plan provisions were consistent with prior interpretations
of the same provision.
F. The Proposed Test
Bringing these considerations together, the author proposes the following test. A discretionary denial of benefits made by an ERISA fiduciary is subject to abuse of discretion review. The court's first step
should be to determine the correct decision. If the administrator's decision was in fact the correct one, then the court's inquiry ends and the decision is upheld. If not, then the court must determine if the decision
was erroneous on the law. If it was the court overturns the administrator's decision. Otherwise, the reviewing court must proceed to weigh
applicable factors to determine whether the plan administrator has
abused its discretion. In so doing, the court may consider the following
nonexhaustive list of factors: (1) whether the plan fiduciary was operating under a conflict of interest, and the nature and severity of that conflict; (2) whether or not the decision is consistent with the purpose of the
plan, if the plan has a particular purpose within the general interests of
the participants; (3) whether the administrator's decision was supported
by substantial evidence; (4) whether all significant issues were considered in the decisionmaking process; (5) whether the fiduciary's plan interpretation is consistent with the clear language of the plan; (6) whether

257.
258.
259.
260.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt. d (1959).
See supra notes 219-24 and accompanying text.
That is, whether the decision was arbitrary or the result of caprice.
See supra notes 130, 132 and accompanying text.
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the fiduciary's plan interpretation would render parts of the plan inconsistent or meaningless; (7) whether the decision and decisionmaking
process comport with the regulatory protections of ERISA, (8) whether
the decision was the result of a reasoned and principled decisionmaking
process; (9) whether the fiduciary's plan interpretation is consistent with
prior interpretations; and (10) for medical benefits, whether the decision
was made after a full independent medical review, and the individual
making the final decision made it on the basis of information he could
fully understand. The manner in which these factors interact will vary
depending on the specifics of the case involved-in many instances,
some of the factors may not be at issue at all. Further, these factors are
nonexclusive and the reviewing court may consider additional factspecific issues as appropriate.
VII. CONCLUSION

ERISA promised the American worker protection and uniformity in
the handling of employee benefits. For thirty years, those workers have
looked to the federal judicial system to review fiduciary denials of benefits and to ensure that the legislative goals of ERISA were achieved, but
the federal courts have historically failed to produce an adequate system
for reviews that ensures the protection of workers and the uniform fair
handling of their claims. The author has proposed a test for deferential
review of these fiduciary decisions, one that protects employees from
conflicted plan fiduciaries, gives guidance to the district courts to promote uniform decisions, and still preserves the role of the courts as providing review of discretionary decisions. In the wake of MetLife, it is
past time for the circuit courts to reconcile their conflicting precedents
and bring them in line with the purposes of ERISA and the guidance the
Supreme Court has provided in this area.
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